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ABSTRACT  
 
The purpose of this research study was to obtain the views and perceptions of 
Namibia veterans of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the armed 
wingof SWAPO, on compensation as a part of the disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration (DDR) process. This process compensates former freedom 
fighters as a reward for having contributed to the liberation struggle. DDR is one 
of the most important peace stabilising tools that is internationally recognised 
and the UN has adopted it as a pre-requisite for any peace agreement process in 
countrieswhich had experienced violent conflict. 
 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the war veterans’ perception 
regarding ‘compensation’ being paid as a reward to former fighters of the 
Namibia liberation struggle by the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs.Structured 
interviews were conducted to collect data, and data analysis was done by 
identifying themes.Microsoft Excel statistics functions were used to calculate the 
totals, produce tables, graphs and pie charts.   
 
The main finding of the study was that the former freedom fighters were facing 
many challenges and the government was far from addressing these challenges 
in their totality. The study found that the government was committed to address 
the plight of the former freedom fighters; however, the implementation of such 
a programme was fraught with challenges, such as the lack of resources and 
good governance. Moreover, the study established that the reintegration 
process was not addressing the issues of both groups of ex-combatants in 
Namibia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 THE ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The study explored the expectations of Namibian war veterans in terms of 
monetary compensation and other forms of non-monetary compensation. This 
study took into account that when the Namibia war veterans joined the 
liberation struggle in the sixties, they were inspired by the wind of change that 
was sweeping the African continent to liberate Africa from colonialism, and the 
fact that they were volunteer fighters. 
The study was necessitated took into account the view of Hill, Taylor and Temin 
(2008) that, while most studies of demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) programmes focus on determining the numbers of 
participants and evaluating the effectiveness of vocational training, few studies 
have focused on how the ex-combatants themselves regard their own 
reintegration and their future in the society after the war. DDR constitutes three 
components which are integral to peace-building. DDR is a process aimed for the 
collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms. It also includes the 
development of arms management programmes. The view is that when the 
number of weapons available in the society is reduced, it gives the monopoly 
regarding the means of violence to the state.  
Demobilisation is a process of reducing the number of armed forces and, in some 
cases, to integrate combatants from opposing sides into one regular army. The 
process involves the following activities: a survey of combatants, an assessment 
of their needs, medical examinations, assembly, counselling and orientating, as 
well as discharging and transporting former combatants and their dependents to 
their homes of origin or where they want to settle after the end of the war. 
During this process, the ex-combatants receive a form of short-term assistance, 
termed ‘re-insertion’ to help them finding their feet. The assistance covers basic 
needs, such as cash or kind which includes clothing, food, shelter, construction 
materials and health services.  
2 
 
Reintegration is a long term process that takes place on multiple social, political 
and economic levels. Reintegration addresses the following: it investigates the 
psychological impact of conflict on ex-combatants and ensures that the support to 
ex-combatants does not cause jealousy among other members of the community 
to a point where there will be discontent that can undermine the peace-building 
process (Cutis& Dzinesa, 2013). 
Omarch (2013) in Curtis and Dzineza (2013) claim that DDR is an important 
element in conflict solution and it plays an important role in establishing 
security and development. Security and development form the centre of discourse 
that perceives poverty, underdevelopment and poor governance as being at the 
root of violent crime and conflict. DDR discourse views conflict as a factor that 
undermines development and deepens poverty and underdevelopment, which in 
turn, create conditions for further conflict. 
1.2 Background and context of the study 
 
Namibia gained its independence on 21st March 1990, marking the independence 
of all Southern Africa countries, since Namibia was the last colony in the region 
to gain its independence. Namibia’s independence was gained as a result of a 
peace agreement brokered by the United Nations (UN) as per Resolution 435 of 
the United Nations Security Council, which called for an end to a protracted and 
bitter liberation war and the holding of free and fair elections based on principles 
of democracy. Elections were won by the South West Africa People’s 
Organisation (SWAPO), formerly a liberation movement. 
 
A former liberation movement, SWAPO, found itself as a government entrusted 
with the role of leading a nation. SWAPO’s People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN) freedom fighters were overwhelmed by the joy that the war had come to 
an end. Moreover, the PLAN fighters were eager and willing to disarm and 
demobilise and go back to their homes to reunite with their families once again 
(Dzinesa, 2006). 
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As a result, the PLAN fighters obeyed their commanders when they were told to 
go home and wait until such a time that they were to be called for any 
employment opportunities. However, this euphoria was short-lived. Soon after 
the independence celebrations were over, the reality started to sink in. Former 
PLAN combatants realised that they were on their own as they were not any 
longer in military bases or refugee camps where they were accustomed to free 
handouts.  
The ex-combatants had to face the reality that once they were back in the 
country they needed to find employment to earn an income to support 
themselves and their families. The option of finding a career in the government 
or private sector did not work out for every ex-combatant. This was further 
exacerbated by the fact that most ex-combatants did not have formal 
qualifications because they had spent most of their youth fighting for the 
liberation of Namibia. This research study has confirmed claims made by 
Dzinesa (2006; 2008) and Lamb (2013)that the majority of the former PLAN 
fighters had never attended formal school; as a result, all they knew was how to 
handle a gun. 
Furthermore, it is the view of the researcher that former freedom fighters in 
Namibia were not properly reintegrated into civilian life. This resulted in some 
form of unrest and demonstrations by former freedom fighters, who were 
expressing their unhappiness and frustrations, as well as making political 
statements in local media against the Namibian government for neglecting them. 
This was a clear indication that the former freedom fighters were not happy with 
their living conditions in an independent Namibia. As a result, they pressurised 
the government to improve their living conditions. Their plight was supported by 
civil organisations who also expressed the same sentiments regarding the living 
standards of ex-combatants in Namibia, as was summed up by Jauch (2013), a 
civil activist who, in support of ex-combatants, stated the following: 
The political activists and observers may argue that Namibia had little choice 
in adopting a capitalist market economy at Independence, thus could not 
really effect any substantial redistribution in favour of the poor. However, 
ideals of justice and solidarity continued to be pronounced by political leaders 
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and there was no doubt that inequality and poverty required a systematic 
state intervention if any socio-economic progress was to be achieved. One of 
those interventions was the payment of war veterans, many of whom 
continued to struggle to make ends meet after Independence. 
Considering the security threats posed by former freedom fighters, the Namibian 
government started to take note of the concerns of the former fighters. This 
resulted in formal engagements and negotiations to address the reintegration of 
ex-combatants. A consequence was the formation of the Socio-Economic 
Integration Programme for Ex-Combatants (SIPE) funded by the Government, 
primarily established to alleviate the plight of disabled and jobless freedom 
fighters, including those orphaned by Namibia's liberation war (Gaomas, 2004; 
Metsola, 2010; 1996; Clapman, 2012). 
 
As a result of this initiative, many former freedom fighters found employment in 
the security sectors, for example, the Namibian Police, Namibia Defence Force 
and government agencies. Those who could not be employed, due to their age, 
disability and other factors, were referred to social welfare institutions to qualify 
for social grants.  
Another programme was to cater for those who could not be reintegrated into 
government structures. They were placed with the Development Brigade 
Cooperation (DBC) so that they could be trained in vocational skills and engage 
in income-generating projects. However, the researcher observed that DBC did 
not succeed in its intended objectives to assist former fighters to become self-
reliant. DBC did not have proper structures, as well as qualified personnel, to 
manage a programme of such magnitude. As a result, the DBC was unable to 
execute its mandated functions, resulting in former freedom fighters turning to 
the streets, protesting again. 
Similarly, a peace project was established to look into the psycho-social issues of 
ex-combatants, as well as to find long-term employment for ex-combatants. This 
action was a response to the first wave of demonstrations by former fighters. The 
second wave of demonstrations in 2006 gave birth to the Ministry of Veterans’ 
Affairs (Metsola, 1996; Dzinesa, 2006). 
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The Namibian government was also faced with the challenge of the former South 
West African Territorial Force (SWATF) and the South West Africa Police 
Counter Insurgency Unit (KOEVOET) troops who fought under South African 
Defence Force(SADF).This group of ex-soldiers had regrouped for meetings, 
protests and was issuing ultimatums, demanding to be recognised as war 
veterans as well. These former combatants had been camping at the offices of the 
Herero Traditional Authority in protest against the Namibia government. They 
were of the opinion that, like any other Namibian, they too were affected and 
deserved to be acknowledged as war veterans and be accorded the same 
privileges given to other ex-combatants(in this case, the former freedom fighters 
under the leadership of the SWAPO movement). However, the Namibian 
government was not willing to grant them any benefits. The government was of 
the opinion that they had been working for the ‘imperialists’; hence, they should 
be compensated by the ‘imperialists’ (Nkala, 2012).  
Challenges of DDR planning and implementation were also common in several 
cases. For instance, Zena (2013) notes that, while the first two components of 
DDR were relatively easy to plan, implement and manage, it was at the stage of 
reintegration where the problems started to show. The components of 
reintegration differed, depending on the expectations of participants, but it 
usually included skills training, loans, job placement and assistance to re-
socialise ex-combatants and facilitate their relocation to permanent homes (Zena, 
2013). As such, this phase was usually long, compared to the processes of 
demobilisation and disarmament. It is quite interesting to note that, as the 
definition and scope of DDR had been changing, most countries came up with 
different definitions and scopes of DDR, because of the reintegration phase which 
was usually long. Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) note that the scope and 
dimensions of DDR went through three phases of change due to inherent 
contextual complexities. Consequently, Namibia’s reintegration process was no 
exception, as it was caught in the web of new requirements because the different 
scopes and dimensions of DDR continued to evolve (Lamb, 2013; African 
Development Bank Group (2011). 
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1.3 The problem statement 
 
Namibia’s DDR programme, specifically the reintegration element, is yet to be 
completed and administered. This was revealed by the disgruntled ex-
combatants as they had been staging demonstrations and protests, demanding 
jobs and compensation for their contributions during the liberation struggle. 
First it was the demonstrations and protests by the elderly ex-combatants until 
the year 2007 when the government opened dialogue with them. However, soon 
after the ex-combatants had stopped their protests, their children, including 
those of the deceased ex-combatants, took to the streets in mass demonstrations 
demanding to be granted ‘veteran status’ as well. Furthermore, former SWATF 
and KOEVOET members were also demanding reintegration benefits. This 
situation regarding the ‘kids of the liberation struggle’ and KOEVOET/SWATF 
had been going on for some time.  Based on these developments, it can be argued 
that the reintegration process, which is normally designed to address such 
issues, was not properly conducted (Isaacs, 2007; Heita, 2009; Ikela, 2015). 
 
When one considers the above, it is the view of researcher that, if the issue of 
war veterans in Namibia is not addressed, the current situation is likely to pose 
a security threat, as well as a threat to peace and stability in the country. It is, 
therefore, imperative for the Namibia government to obtain a clear 
understanding of the demands made by these ex-soldiers. It appears that not 
much research was done regarding the implementation of the reintegration of 
war veterans in Namibia. Therefore, there is a need for further research on the 
reintegration of war veterans in Namibia. 
1.4 The study objectives 
 
The purpose of the study was to explore the expectations, views and opinions of 
the war veterans from the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) process in terms of compensation, with the aim to provide a good 
understanding of former combatants’ needs and views regarding their 
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expectations in relation to their reintegration into society. This study employed 
the term ‘compensation’ which is a term used by the ex-combatants when 
demanding recognition within the reintegration programme for the contribution 
they had made to the liberation struggle as PLAN soldiers. 
The study was also seeking to understand how the former combatants were 
briefed by their commanders during the demobilisation process. It is generally 
assumed that when the war veterans were inspired to join the liberation 
struggle, they had expectations that, in the event that they had won the war, 
they would come back home as heroes and heroines who would enjoy a share of 
the country’s resources. The study attempted to find answers and confirm the 
hopes, expectations and dreams of the war veterans about a liberated Namibia.  
In addition, the researcher believes that the on-going processes of DDR in other 
countries acted as an eye-opener to the ex-combatants, in such a way that they 
felt that they had to be compensated or the government should attend to their 
needs for compensation due to their war efforts. Consequently, the study sought 
to evaluate their expectations against reality, and how to bridge the gap between 
the two. 
Hence, the research addressed the following sub-objectives: 
To examine the DDR practices as they were implemented in Namibia; 
To establish the main players or initiators of Namibia’s DDR processes; 
To establish the expectations of ex-combatants in relation to the DDR processes; 
To establish the challenges faced by the war veterans of the Namibian liberation 
struggle; 
To determine the challenges faced by the Namibian government in the 
reintegration of ex-combatants; 
To assist the Namibian government to address the plight of the ex-combatants 
1.5 Research questions 
In order to meet the objectives highlighted above, the following research 
questions were formulated to gain the perspectives of war veterans:  
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The key questions were: 
What are the ex-combatants’ expectations of the DDR processes? 
What are the current challenges faced by ex-combatants? 
To what extent was the DDR programme implemented in Namibia? 
The sub questions were: 
Who are the main players or initiators in Namibia’s DDR process? 
What are the challenges faced by the Namibian government in assisting war 
veterans? 
1.6 Significance of the study 
 
The study is very important to the body of knowledge as there is need to assess 
the grievances, if the conflict resolution is going to be successful. To the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is a very limited number of studies that have 
focused on evaluating the ex-combatants’ view in relation to compensation as 
part of the package of the DDR process.  
 
There is a need to compare theory learnt with practical issues on the ground. The 
study will provide guidance to policy makers, planners and the Ministry of War 
Veterans’ Affairs to assess what is expected of them compared to what they 
deliver. 
1.7 Literature review 
 
1.7.1 Overview of DDR programmes in Africa 
 
Africa portrays a critical situation in relation to its DDR programmes. In 2013, 
500,000 individuals in a variety of no state militias, national armies and para-
military groups elected to undergo DDR programmes across Africa as a result of 
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previous war and armed conflicts (Zena, 2013). Central to these armed conflicts 
were liberation movements. These were pitted either against a racist and 
authoritarian government – most common in parts of Southern Africa, such as 
South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe – or against rebel groups that had support 
from other governments or domestic sources of sustenance – something that is 
common in Central, Northern and West Africa, for instance Cote d’Ivore, Sudan 
and Libya (Lamb, 2013). 
From a general point of view, in Africa DDR programmes had been very 
complicated to deal with, to such an extent that not even the first step of 
disarmament was achieved. For example, following the 2011 anti-Gadhafi 
revolution, efforts to initiate DDR programmes were proving difficult at the very 
first step of disarmament. Libyan authorities estimated that 150,000 combatants 
needed to be disarmed, and many judged this issue to be among the most 
difficult challenges of the post-Gadhafi transition (Zena, 2013). This could be 
attributed to the lack of trust among different militias as witnessed in the case of 
South Sudan. Another case is that of Cote d’Ivore where the DDR was facing 
problems with claims that up to 100,000 combatants needed to be demobilised. 
In addition, after the 2012 armed attacks that killed civilians, UN peace keepers 
and government troops indicated that militants remained armed. This was an 
indication that disarmament was yet to be accomplished, even after the 2011 
election. These and other cases are discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
However, despite challenges witnessed in other cases, Africa has recorded 
positive outcomes from its DDR initiatives, even though the initiatives or 
programmes are still far from over. Zena (2013) notes that the peace 
arrangements in Burundi and Liberia were arguably more effective than the 
programme in the DRC. The clarity of the DDR framework in the negotiated 
settlement was an important head-start which included timeframes, technical 
plans, the composition of the reformed security forces (including a balanced 
representation of senior officers and ethnic groups) and a commitment by 
authorities to satisfy basic provisions for the disarmed and to work toward 
longer-term reintegration (Pugel, 2006). 
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1.8 The research methodology 
 
This section explains the research methodology of the current study. In 
particular, the study is aligned to the interpretivist research paradigm; hence, it 
employed a qualitative case study approach for its data collection.The study used 
a qualitative design as its guideline; this approach is useful in this study because 
it assists in obtaining information through the use of various techniques, such as 
face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions. 
1.9 Thesis outline 
 
 Chapter 1: Introduction: this chapter introduced the research. It 
delineated the research problem and objectives. It also explained in brief 
the research methodology. 
 Chapter 2: Literature review: this chapter presents a literature review 
on DDR. It, furthermore,presents and evaluates case studies on DDR 
programmes implemented in Africa, including that in Namibia.  
 Chapter 3: Research methodology: this chapter explains the research 
methodology for data collection. The research made use of a qualitative 
case study design for its data collection. Interviews and document analysis 
were used for data collection. Data gathered, as described in this chapter, 
were used to evaluate the research questions in order to meet the research 
objectives of this study. 
 Chapter 4: Presentation and analysis of data: this chapter presents 
the findings from the data collected. The researcher employed content 
analysis with coding in the data analysis. 
 Chapter 5: Summary and conclusions: this chapter presents the 
overall conclusion of the research. It evaluates what was done to address 
the research questions and meet the research objectives. The research 
limitations and recommendations are also included. 
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1.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced the research. The continued demonstrations by ex-
combatants and their children demanding government compensation or support 
were identified as this study’s research problem. In other words, the complaints 
from ex-combatants suggested that they felt as if they were not adequately 
compensated for their role in the liberation struggle.  
 
Accordingly, the study sought to explore the expectations, views and opinions of 
the war veterans regarding the DDR process in terms of compensation. This was 
done with the aim to provide a good understanding of former combatant’s needs, 
as well as their views regarding their expectations in relation to reintegration. A 
case study research methodology was used to meet the research objectives. 
12 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the literature reviewed regarding the DDR programme or 
initiatives. Zena (2013) noted that despite the growing need for DDR, previous 
DDR programmes in Africa had encountered many challenges and bore mixed 
results. Irrespective of the encountered challenges and subsequent failures in 
some of the DDR initiatives, experiences from these DDR initiatives still play a 
critical role as a source of guidance to those who are implementing DDR 
programmes. 
This chapter evaluates and analyses how the elements that constitute or define 
DDR have been evolving, given the changing nature of issues that threaten 
peace. It goes on to evaluate the implementation of the DDR programme within 
the African context. An analysis of Namibia’s implementation of its DDR 
programmes is also included.  
2.2.1Definitions of DDR and related terms 
 
Literature suggests a constant shift in what constitutes a DDR programme and 
itsexpectations due to the ever-changing complexities in conflicts (Muggah& 
O’Donnell, 2015; Zena, 2013). Muggah and O’Donnell (2015)note that DDR is no 
longer the preserve of peace-keeping forces alone, but is routinely included in 
wider peace-building activities, counter-insurgency and stability operations, in 
tandem with counter-terrorism and anti-crime measures. On the other hand, 
Zena (2013) is of the opinion that the success of a DDR programme may be 
contingent upon the progress of a peace settlement, a political transition or a 
security sector reform effort, but this does not mean that DDR should be 
designed to achieve these ends directly or compensate for their shortcomings. 
While both of these arguments are correct, this study argues that the scopes and 
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dimensions of a DDR programme are mainly influenced by the circumstantial 
factors that help to shape the context in which the programmes are being 
applied. As such, this study concedes that DDR is a process aimed at helping 
with a smooth transition and mitigation of the impact of setbacks and other 
obstacles as part of a broader political effort (Zena, 2013). The following terms 
aligned to DDR are used: 
 Disarmament is defined by the United Nations (1990) as the collection, 
documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, 
explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of 
the civilian population. It also includes the development of responsible 
arms management programmes.  
 Demobilisation is defined by the United Nations (1990) as a formal, 
controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other 
armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the 
processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing 
of troops in camps designated for this purpose, such as cantonment sites, 
encampments, assembly areas or barracks (United Nations, 1990). 
 Reinsertion is defined by the United Nations (1990) as support 
packages provided to the demobilised combatants to help cover their 
basic needs, such as transition, safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, 
medical services, short term education, training, employment and tools.  
 Reintegration: The United Nations (1990) identifies reintegration as a 
process by which an ex-combatant acquires civilian status and gains 
sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and 
economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in 
communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a 
country and it is a national responsibility which often necessitates long-
term external assistance. 
 Veterans: According to the Veterans’ Act, Act No.2 of 2008, a veteran is 
any person who (a) was a member of the liberation forces; (b) 
consistently and persistently participated or engaged in any political, 
diplomatic or underground activity in furtherance of the liberation 
struggle; (c) owing to his or her participation in the liberation struggle 
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was convicted, whether in Namibia or elsewhere, of any offence closely 
connected to the struggle, and sentenced to imprisonment. It does not 
include a person who deserted during the liberation struggle, unless that 
person subsequently re-joined the struggle (Amagulu, 2012). 
 
2.2.2  The signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides the 
Framework for DDR 
 
Peace agreements do not always contain clear DDR provisions. In Afghanistan, 
the Born Agreement of 2001 only made vague references to demobilisation, while 
the Compact of 2006 included a succinct provision for the disbandment of armed 
groups. In Haiti there was no agreement at all, while in Cote d’Ivoire and in 
DRC there were multiple agreements with conflicting provisions for DDR 
making a complex scenario (Colleta, Schojorlien, & Berts, 2008).This 
precondition, which recommends that a negotiated peace agreement be signed, 
assumes that all warring parties are signatories to the peace agreement. 
However, in a majority of the cases examined by the UN all parties were not 
included in the peace process. 
2.2 3 Trust in the peace process 
 
While the trust in the overall peace process of the parties to the conflict is 
extremely difficult to evaluate, it is a key prerequisite for a successful traditional 
DDR. It may take time for parties to trust each other and, hence, they may wish 
to hold on to the military means that have brought them to the negotiating table, 
and in so doing, delaying the DDR (Lamb, 2011). 
2.2.4 Willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR 
 
The political will of the warring parties to engage in DDR is crucial to a 
successful process(Lamb, 2011). If the parties are not willing to be at peace with 
each other the peace process becomes almost impossible. 
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2.2.5 A minimum guarantee of security 
 
Without a minimum guarantee of security, armed groups and individuals are 
unlikely to disarm. Many combatants will, therefore, be reluctant to relinquish a 
weapon which they perceive to be their guarantee of security (Lamb, 2011). For 
example, in Sudan despite the presence of two peace-keeping missions, the 
security situation in some parts of the country remains unstable due to armed 
conflicts. 
 
2.2.6 DDR practices and challenges 
2.2.6.1 Disarmament 
 
The first part is disarmament where the armed forces are disarmed. This is done 
when there is a call for the armed forces to surrender their weapons. It comprises 
the assembly of combatants, the collection and documentation of weapons and 
the verification and certification of disarmed soldiers to assess their eligibility for 
further assistance and benefits (Lamb, 2011). The short-term aim is to enhance 
security by reducing the number of weapons owned by individuals and to restore 
trust among warring parties. In the long term, the process is intended to prevent 
the circulation of small arms in particular and their proliferation to other 
countries through the black market(Knight & Ozerdem, 2004). This is a crucial 
stage as the forces need to be convicted. The keeping of weapons has a negative 
impact on the peace process in terms of crime and possible war eruptions. During 
this process an arms and armament committee should be established to monitor 
the process. 
The disarmament of combatants may take the form of a unilateral disarmament 
of one group, a bilateral disarmament of two opposing groups or multiple 
disarmament of a number of armed groups (Metsola, 1996). The disarmament 
process may follow one of the three approaches: 
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 A consensual approach in which all conflicting parties agree to hand in 
their weapons; 
 A coercive approach in which one or more parties are forced to disarm; 
 A compelling approach on a ‘carrots and sticks’ philosophy. 
2.2.6.2 Demobilisation 
 
Demobilisation is the process that usually starts with the opening of a reception 
centre, which provides a first home for returning combatants, and it continues by 
preparing former combatants for, and helping them with, their re-entry into 
civilian life. During this stage soldiers are usually cantoned in demobilisation 
sites or camps.  
Combatants are usually separated from their commanders and eventually 
transported to their home towns or new living quarters (Preston, Smith, & 
Kefford, 2008). Sometimes, certain fighters are exempted from this practice and 
integrated into the regular armed force in order to sustain a functioning military 
body. 
2.2.6.3 Reintegration 
 
Reintegration is the process where combatants arrive home and have to readjust 
to civilian life. While some fighters are respectfully welcomed back as heroes, 
others are eyed suspiciously and rejected by host communities (Njata, 2012). A 
primary objective in this phase is the absorption of former fighters by the labour 
market, so that they gain access to income-generating activities and join their 
communities’ social networks. These not only replace the jobs and salaries they 
have lost, but also ensure that veterans develop a sense of belonging and well-
being in their new civilian environment.  
In this endeavour, reintegration measures include different forms of support, 
which can roughly be divided into three categories: economic assistance, 
education and psychosocial support.    
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 Economic assistance is financial assistance commonly awarded in the form 
of single payments, monthly rents or a number of instalments. The amount 
varies from one country to another and one support programme to another. 
 Education is assistance given to those lacking skills and who need them. 
Some might need basic education, some vocational training, some 
university education and some assistance to obtain employment. 
 Psychological support is meant to foster the social and psychological well-
being of ex-combatants in their daily lives, and also to nurture their ability 
to build social relationships, pursue careers and relate to their communities 
(Schaucer, 2006). 
2.2.6.4 Challenges faced by the DDR practice 
 
Challenges have been found in different places when implementing DDR 
practices. In Burundi there has been continued conflict as one of the rebel 
movements has not respected the agreement; hence, there is resistance to disarm 
because of mistrust between parties. These lacks of trust lead to inaccurate 
numbers of armed forces being communicated by the parties (United Nations 
Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2005). In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo the disarmament was not done well; so much so, that now the civilians are 
armed, and there are no financial resources for disarmament, due to the 
unfavourable economic environment (United Nations Office of the Special 
Adviser on Africa, 2005). In Zimbabwe there was inaccurate information on the 
strength of the forces; the most skilled, white, military forces resigned and the 
combatants were not completely accepted by the communities, especially the 
female ex-combatants. Therefore, the private sector did not want to employ 
them. Another challenge was psychological issues affecting the ex-combatants 
from which they had to heal by themselves (United Nations Office of the Special 
Adviser on Africa, 2005). 
2.3 Expectations by war veterans before, during, and after the struggle 
 
When people are recruited to join war, there are promises made to them to 
convince them to go. Some are convinced by a payment and are known as 
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mercenaries or soldiers of fortune. Some of the people are convinced, and hence 
they become part of the cause and hence they do it because they need to ‘liberate 
their country’. At this point their goal is to liberate their country and hope to 
receive the reward of a better lifewhen the country isfree. At the point of 
recruitment the better life is not properly defined but it is left to the recruited 
person’s imagination. As they progress in war, these goals may change, as they 
are sometimes exposed to resources, such as minerals and other proceeds they 
may receive. When they come back home after the war is over, they have to 
redefine the ‘good life’ or ‘better’ life as reality dawns to them. They may realise 
that going to war was not enough: they still need qualifications, hard work and 
capital for conducting business, pay for health care, taxes, school and all the 
other things they have associated with ‘colonialism’. At this stage these 
combatants may feel cheated and only used to assist those who obtained high 
positions in the new government (Red Cross Society, 1977).For example, 
Mukwahepo in Namhila (2013) complained about how they were treated as 
useful freedom fighters in the time of exile but became useless in an independent 
Namibia. This sentiment is held because many former combatants, including 
main figures, were being left out by their comrades in 1990 in the formation of 
the new Namibia government.  
2.6 General perceptions of the war veterans regarding government 
efforts 
 
Combatants in post-conflict settings can be roughly divided into three categories. 
A significant proportion of armed actors forms the first group that will 
voluntarily self-demobilise once a viable peace framework seems to be in place. 
The second group will harbour deeper ties and vested interests in the military, 
while the third group is the hard core who hesitates to disarm, fearing exposure 
and being made vulnerable in an insecure, uncertain and volatile environment 
(Colletta &Muggah, 2009). In Burundi, many combatants did not have much 
interest to be professional militants; therefore, they were willing to become part 
of DDR process (Ulvin, 2007). In many DDR programmes, about 20 percent of 
former combatants who were demobilised never claimed transitional or 
reintegration benefits. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, surveys indicate that 10-15 
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percent of ex-combatants opted not to participate in DDR at all. Therefore, it 
appears to be a secondary concern for those who demobilised on their own to 
become part, or beneficiaries of, a DDR programme (Pugel, 2007). 
The second group is typical of senior officers in rank, to whom demobilisation 
means loss of influence and authority. They obtained their profit through illicit 
taxation or trafficking of minerals and commodities for their role as leaders of 
the militia or the armed forces. Some of these combatants may face prosecution 
or investigation for war crimes and, therefore, have strong incentives to remain 
armed and active. Such die-hard combatants are not interested in promises of 
skills training or reintegration assistance (Colletta & Muggah). 
The third group is made up of the hard core combatants. They lack suitable 
income-earning alternatives, so may worry that disarmament would be the end 
of their livelihood; however, they do not have motive or interest to remain 
combatants. Banholzer (2014), furthermore, notes that the length that an 
individual combatant stays or is forced to stay with an armed group appears to 
affect the DDR process. For example, rebels who had stayed more than a year in 
the RENAMO base camp in Mozambique, displayed more anti-social and 
aggressive behaviour than combatants who had spent a shorter period in the 
camp. Hence, this group of combatants would likely need psychological help to 
reject militancy. Consequently, they would benefit more from the DDR 
programmes (Banholzer, 2014). 
 
2.7 The evolution of DDR programmes 
 
Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) suggest that, over the past three decades, the 
DDR elements have grown from that of playing the role of preserving peace-
keeping forces alone to routinely include wider peace-building activities, counter-
insurgency and stability operations, including counter-terrorism and anti-crime 
measures. This could align to what Zena (2013) terms as measures of a 
successful DDR programme, which 
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May be contingent upon the progress of a peace settlement, a political 
transition, or a security sector reform effort, but this does not mean that 
DDR should be designed to directly achieve these ends or compensate for 
their shortcomings. 
Nevertheless, the requirements of the first forms of DDR programmes differ 
slightly from the current requirements as a result of dynamic challenges that 
threaten peace. Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) note that the DDR programmes 
have been changing in scope and depth. These changes can be traced back, and 
grouped into three categories, namely the DDR first wave, a second generation of 
DDR and the next generation DDR. 
2.7.1 DDR first wave 
 
The first wave of DDR initiatives was implemented to solve problems resulting 
from international and civil wars. In the late 1990s, DDR was promoted by 
peace, security and development communities, especially amongst 
representatives of the United Nations agencies, the World Bank and a number of 
bilateral aid agencies (Muggah& O’Donnell, 2015). During the first wave,among 
others, DDR was to abolish military control and power among senior military 
personnel and soldiers or rebels who would, in turn, receive reintegration 
assistance where possible. This could also include pensions and, in some 
instances, some members would re-apply and occupy newly formed security 
forces. Colletta, et al.(1996, in Muggah and O’Donnell, 2015) are of the opinion 
that the first wave DDR initiatives had had positive impacts in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa, based on the fact that they 
contributed in preventing the recurrence of armed conflicts. 
 
However, the first wave DDR presented cases where it did not prove a success, 
due to several factors. For instance, DDR schemes in Cambodia, Haiti and the 
Philippines in the 1990s failed to collect sizeable numbers of weapons or 
demobilise fighting forces, much less stem a return to political violence in the 
short-term (Muggah, 2005; 2009 in Muggah& O’Donnell, 2015). 
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2.7.2 A second generation of DDR 
 
The United Nations indicate that a second generation of DDR had arrived by 
2010 as a result of the growing edifice of security sectors and peace-building 
scholars(Al-Qaisi, 2013, in Muggahand O’Donnell, 2015). DDR programmes 
expanded in scope from focusing on demobilising and reintegrating ex-
combatants to building conditions for sustainable peace. This would include 
reconciliation measures between former soldiers and communities and promoting 
their economic livelihoods.  
The birth of the second generation of DDR was motivated by wars in West and 
Central Africa, the Balkans and Southeast Asia that had resulted from erstwhile 
soldiers, rebels and civilians who necessitated internal conflicts even after the 
war. Lamb (2013) explains the reason for moving from the traditional DDR 
process, and points out that the traditional DDR process was focusing mainly on 
armed combatants only, but this approach did not guarantee peace and stability. 
As a result, DDR practitioners moved to the next level that went beyond 
demobilisation and collecting of weapons. It became obvious that employing 
disarmament and demobilisation elements only were not enough and that the 
risks for failure to bring lasting peace and stability were there. Hence, the DDR 
practitioners devised a new approach, termed the second generation DDR, as a 
response to a challenging context in which the UN was working alongside 
national governments, civil societies and international partners to maintain the 
peace process and contribute to stabilisation (Lamb, Alusal, Broodryk, Mthembu-
Salter & Stern, 2011). 
There were concerns that the widening of peace-keeping mandates, and by 
extension DDR, would set unrealistic expectations of what could reasonably be 
achieved; especially, given the timeframe, numerous DDR programmes in 
several countries, budget constraints and the likelihood of new DDR programmes 
that might spring up in conflict-prone countries (UN, 2010). 
Over the subsequent decade, the DDR programme began adapting in line with 
the evolution of global peace, security and development agendas. When the 
mandates of the United Nations, peace support operations began expanding in 
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the late 1990s and early 2000s, the policies and practices of DDR unsurprisingly 
changed alongside them. The second generation of DDR programmes shifted 
from the old, former agenda of focusing on combatants who were part of military 
structures. The second generation DDR programmes moved away from an 
exclusive focus on military structures towards the larger communities that were 
affected by the armed violence. This shift enabled DDR programmes to assist 
and include more beneficiaries who were excluded from traditional DDR 
programmes.  
The second generation DDR approach enabled many activities that were not 
possible to be implemented if the prerequisite conditions of the DDR 
programmes were not met. The second generation programmes were locally driven, 
designed and implemented by using a locally evidence-based approach (UN, 2010). 
 
2.7.3 Next generation DDR 
 
DDR programmes were commonly associated with members who participated 
voluntarily, based on set or prescribed agreements. However, the next generation 
DDR was inserted with forceful elements in its implementation. Muggah and 
O'Donnell, (2015, p. 4)give the example of the DRC, stating that 
“the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where some 20,000 
members of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, or FDLR, 
were repatriated to their home country between 2000 and 2010”.  
Muggah and O’Donnell (2015), furthermore, state that  
“There, a new kind of forceful DDR was initiated in the context of ‘robust 
peacekeeping’ operations in 2012 to neutralise the remaining, approximately 
2,000 hard-core FDLR fighters who continued to ravage the Eastern Congo”. 
This sentiment has also been supported by the UN (2014a, in 
Muggah&O’Donnell, 2015) and Joselow (2015). 
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2.8 Key factors for the successful outcome of DDR 
 
Curtis and Dzinesa (2013) claim that there are two main factors that determine 
the successful outcome of DDR, namely political will, which is a fundamental 
precondition on which to build DDR, and the second is a genuine commitment of 
parties to the process. These two elements are vital to the process of DDR. 
2.9 DDR actors and approaches 
 
Curtis and Dzinesa, (2013)list a number of actors in DDR. Among them are 
different global, regional and local actors who are involved in DDR in Africa. The 
multilateral agencies and donor organisations believe that DDR is part of their 
overall framework for liberal reform. 
The World Bank is one of the actors, and limits its support to the two 
components of DDR, namely demobilisation and reintegration. This is because 
the World Bank mandate prevents it from becoming involved in military 
operations. Another actor is the United States of America International 
Development (USAID). They too are involved in two elements of DDR and, as per 
their mandate, are not involved in foreign militaries. 
Several other actors are sub-regional organisations, the African Union (AU), as 
well as local actors, such as civil organisations which include non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and cultural, traditional, as well religious 
organisations(Curtis &Dzinesa,2013). 
 
2.4 Non-government assistance 
 
The United Nations is usually the main support for DDR process in order to 
ensure that peace prevails. There are other organisations that come in, such as 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). A number of reasons lend support to 
the view that the conditions are right for greater NGO influence. Nussio (2010) 
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notes that the military as DDR actors are not the right organs to interact with 
civil society. NGOs, on the contrary, seem to have a favourable advantage in 
responding to conflicts at the local level. In addition, NGOs have gradually 
become chief providers of public welfare and sources of employment. In many 
countries, NGOs fill important short-term gaps in the national administration by 
providing essential services, particularly in the fields of health and education. 
Even UNDP, originally known for its strong emphasis on cooperation with state-
actors, has started to involve NGOs in project execution.  
Furthermore, NGOs have the advantage of being in the area years before the 
outbreak of the conflict or the violence. They have knowledge of the local society 
and culture; something that is lacked by the outside actors who choose to become 
involved in the conflict. Finally, the inclusion of local level NGOs, in the multi-
layered system of governance of a United Nations administered territory, 
contributes to the development of self-rule and democracy building at the local 
level, which is particularly important in the context of post-war societies.  
Conflict management specialists have claimed that international approaches to 
post-conflict peace building have focused too often on the national level elites. 
The increasing integration of local NGOs and officials in the international 
administrational system would strengthen a bottom-up approach (Lamb, 2011). 
2.5 Government assistance 
 
At the time of Independence the new Namibian government was a liberation 
movement that was transitioning into a government. They had many challenges 
in building the government and most of the officials and leaders did not have 
experience running a government. This means there were issues in which the 
government was not in a position to assist. Generally, it is common for newly 
created governments emerging from war that there might be no record keeping, 
nor budget or proper planning. It is, therefore, not easy to keep track of 
government expenditure and other services (Preston, Smith & Kefford, 2008). 
Government assistance to the combatants can only be accounted for after a 
couple of years after independence. 
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2.10 Beneficiaries of DDR programmes 
 
As per the UN’s Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards, there are usually different types of 
beneficiaries, namely those regarded as either direct beneficiaries or indirect 
beneficiaries. It is particularly important to understand the different 
beneficiaries as they play different roles in the DDR programme. These can also 
influence the progress or activities of the DDR programme (United Nation, 
2014). 
 Direct beneficiaries: these include ex-combatants who actively 
participated in the war and those who played a supporting role, such as 
cookers, porters, messengers, women and children who voluntarily joined 
the war or were abducted to join the war or to become sex slaves. The DDR 
approach has become broader, and more beneficiaries are being added to 
include dependents - the spouses, children and other dependents of ex-
combatants.  
Zena (2013) notes that post-conflict combatants could be differentiated into 
three different sub-sets. The first group constitutes combatants who 
harbour no deep commitment to a career as a militant and would eagerly 
participate in a DDR programme once a viable peace framework is in place. 
The second group of combatants has deeper ties and interests in the 
military. They are typically senior in rank, and demobilisation represents a 
substantial sacrifice of influence and authority. This group profited from 
their roles in the conflict, with some involved in illegal activities that could 
see them being investigated for war crimes; therefore, this category is less 
likely to participate in DDR activities. Typical examples include the DRC 
militants who remained armed. The third subset of combatants exists 
between self-demobilisers and the hard-core. This category comprises ex-
combatants who have no interest in remaining in the military but they are 
hesitant to disarm as they have fears regarding security, and have no 
alternative sources of income. Zena (2013) argues that if this category is 
properly organised, DDR programmes could possibly have a bigger impact. 
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 Indirect beneficiaries: these are communities where ex-combatants 
resettle and, as a result, they may benefit from a DDR programme, 
especially when the programme takes place within the community setting. 
They can benefit from incentives in kind or in monetary form that the ex-
combatants might receive. If infrastructures have to be put in place, these 
will also benefit the community at large.  
Zena (2013) continues that DDR programmes need to be designed and 
implemented with clear and unambiguous, eligibility criteria. A careful 
screening process needs to be carried out to determine who can participate in a 
DDR programme. While it is important to exclude non-combatants, it is very 
important that the process does not discriminate against women, children and 
vulnerable groups. Female ex-combatants, supporters and dependents should 
also become beneficiaries of the DDR process. For example, female combatants 
who participated in the battlefield may find it difficult to be recruited into the 
regular army; therefore, they should receive assistance specifically designed for 
their needs and aspirations (Ulvin, 2015). The Namibia Veterans’ Act, 2008 is 
contrary to some of the UN IDDRS operational guidelines and Zena’s (2013) 
views in this context. 
The DDR programme is a delicate process that needs to be treated with 
sensitivity. Therefore, DDR programmes should be implemented in such a way 
that they cannot be regarded as discriminatory, something that could cause 
tension between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (United Nations, 2010). 
2.11A general overview of DDR programmes 
2.11.1 Early DDR initiatives 
 
Shaw (1984, in Banholzer, 2014) claims to have traced evidence of a crude DDR 
process back to the ancient Roman Empire, stating that during the period of the 
ancient Roman Empire, the Romans used crude forms of DDR to assist the 
soldiers returning from war. The programme included the distribution of 
farmland to former soldiers and their re-recruitment into the army (Banholzer, 
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2014). Furthermore, Lamb (2013) supports Shaw’s (1984) evidence that the DDR 
process is an old, peace-stabilising mechanism, which has been in existence for 
centuries. Lamb (2013) claims to have found evidence of DDR programmes at the 
beginning of the 20th century; it appears to be a programme involving the former 
soldiers of the Second Boer War in South Africa in 1902 and the two World Wars.  
 
Lamb (2013), furthermore, claims that America also employed DDR programmes 
in the reintegration of American soldiers who had returned from the war in 
Vietnam. They were assisted to return to civilian life by using DDR initiatives 
similar to the ones used to assist German soldiers of the two World Wars. 
However, the American DDR programme was reported to be well designed and 
better implemented in comparison to the German DDR programme. Based on 
lessons learned from previous DDR programmes, America avoided the mistakes 
made in the DDR programmes for the German soldiers of the Second World War. 
The mistakes made were that many women, who had taken up work in the war 
industries, were pushed out of employment; the reduction of unemployment 
came at the cost of an inflation that, having spiralled out of control in the hyper-
inflation of 1923, led to a painful stabilisation with substantial unemployment in 
its wake. The new republic, by comparison, proved fairly generous in caring for 
disabled veterans by providing them with occupational training and free medical 
care and pensions, and by granting particular protection through the reservation 
of some jobs for the severely disabled. However, this eventually led to the 
creation of expectations that the republic could not fulfil, especially in the wake 
of inflation. Widespread dissatisfaction was the result, as veterans complained 
about the lack of recognition, and the public rejected veterans’ demands as 
excessive(Schumann, (2014). 
Furthermore, Colletta and Muggah (2009) note that after the Cold War, many 
armed conflicts were accompanied by a DDR process as a pre-requisite for peace. 
Moreover, the DDR process became an international standard in bringing peace 
and security to countries emerging from violent conflicts. The United Nations 
agencies took the preceding role amongst the international security and 
development actors (Colletta & Muggah, 2009; Colletta, Schojorlien & Berts, 
2008; Lamb, 2013; Muggah& Krause, 2009). 
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2.11.2 An overview of DDR programmes in Africa 
 
In 2013 there were approximately 500,000 individuals in a variety of non-state 
militias, national armies and paramilitary groups who were slated to undergo 
DDR programmes across Africa as a result of previous wars and armed conflicts 
(Zena, 2013).  Central to these armed conflicts were liberation movements mostly 
pitted against a racist and authoritarian government (most common in parts of 
Southern Africa with reference to South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe) or 
against rebel groups that had support from other governments or domestic 
sources of sustenance that were common in Central, Northern and West Africa, 
for instance Cote d’Ivore, Sudan, Libya (Lamb, 2013). 
DDR programmes targeting post-armed conflicts as a result of domestic sources 
of sustenance have proved difficult to manage, with notable reference to the 
South Sudan and DRC, due to several circumstantial factors. However, when one 
looks at the aims of maintaining peace and stability, DDR programmes targeting 
regions of post-militant conflict that were pitted against a racist and 
authoritarian government, for instance in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, 
have contributed to maintain peace and stability within the region. It should be 
noted that DDR programmes have not been designed to address conflict drivers, 
such as political and economic power imbalances that fuel grievances, illicit 
trafficking that empowers or motivates violent actors, or governance weaknesses 
that tempt spoilers and prompt communities to turn directly to self-defence. 
Nevertheless, the fact that requirements or the scope of DDR programmes has 
been widening cannot go unnoticed (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015; Stephanie, 
2007). 
The DDR process involves roughly the three steps of disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration. In some cases in Africa, not even the first step 
of disarmament has been achieved. For example, in Libya, following the 2011, 
anti-Gadhafi revolution, efforts to initiate a DDR programme are still proving 
difficult at the very first step, namely disarmament. In 2013, Libyan authorities 
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estimated that 150,000 combatants needed to be disarmed and many judged this 
issue to be among the most difficult challenges of the post-Gadhafi transition 
(Zena, 2013). Another case is that of Cote d’Ivore where a DDR programme faced 
complications as revealed by claims that up to 100,000 combatants needed to be 
demobilised. The 2012 armed attacks that killed civilians, UN peace keepers and 
government troops indicated that militants remained armed – an indication that 
disarmament was yet to be achieved even after the 2011 election. 
However, Africa has recorded positive outcomes from its DDR initiatives, even 
though the initiatives or programmes were far from problem-free. Zena 
(2013)notes that the peace arrangements in Burundi and Liberia were arguably 
more effective than the programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
In Burundi the clarity of the DDR framework in the negotiated settlement was 
an important head start which included time for  a balanced representation of 
senior officers and ethnic groups and a commitment by authorities to satisfy 
basic provisions for the disarmed, as well as to work towards longer-term 
reintegration (Pugel, 2006; Zena, 2013). 
The next section gives an overview of the DDR programme of South Sudan. 
2.11.3 DDR programmes: A case of South Sudan 
 
This section reviews DDR initiatives in South Sudan with the aim to establish 
how the processes of DDR were managed. The case of South Sudan is an eye-
opener into establishing the possible consequences of poorly managed DDR 
programmes; as such it can be considered as a learning platform for other 
African countries (Preston, Smith & Kefford, 2008). 
DDR programmes for South Sudan were initiated following the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed between the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) in 
2005. The protocol on security that was part of the agreement was aimed at 
managing the reintegration of ex-combatants. According to the security protocol, 
the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLM/A were to cease fighting and work 
together, as an Interim National DDR Coordination Council was established to 
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oversee the Interim DDR programme in Sudan and South Sudan. The objectives 
of the DDR programme were to prepare ex-combatants socio-politically and 
psychologically to fit into civilian life; support and promote harmonious co-
existence between ex-combatants and the local communities; support self-help 
projects to ensure economic self-reliance among ex-combatants; promote the 
needs of other groups associated with ex-combatants, such as children and 
women, among others; reduce the proliferation of small and light weapons and 
educate the host communities about the values of personal hygiene, malaria and 
HIV/AIDS preventive measures, among other things (Turyamureeba, 2014). 
 
While the responsible authorities had made a tremendous step in Burundi of 
predefining the scope of their DDR initiatives, the majority of these objectives 
were only partially fulfilled. Among other factors leading to the failure to fulfil 
the objectives set for the DDR programme was the little attention that was paid 
to the detailed specificities or the complexity of the environment under which the 
programme was implemented; government negotiators never saw DDR as a 
critical issue requiring urgent attention. Turyamureeba (2014) notes that close to 
half of the DDR target was demobilised and that less than a quarter of the target 
was reintegrated. This resulted in the resurgence of an armed conflict and the 
subsequent outbreak of violence as the government became unpopular. Among 
other factors, Turyamureeba (2014) found the following as central to the poor 
management of DDR in South Sudan: 
 Political will, tensions and funding: With the role of evaluating DDR 
candidates, the SPLA demobilised some ex-combatants, but at the same 
time recruited youthful forces due to fear of threats from Sudan, despite the 
pressure by the donors to reduce the size of the army. Poor funding from 
donors and South Sudan, following disturbances in the main source of 
income (oil production), also negatively affected the conduct of DDR 
programmes. 
 The effect of a miserable economy: Following a ceasefire, ex-combatants 
were of the opinion that it was their turn to be rewarded for their efforts. 
However, they were not aware of the fact that the government did not have 
enough resources following its poor economic performance.  
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 The reintegration package: too little, too late: It was noted that 
packages in the DDR programme were inadequate and sharply differed 
from the expectations of the ex-combatants. Ideally, the reintegration 
package should include three broad categories: psychological, social and 
economic support. Economic reintegration support should involve formal 
education, vocational training, as well as employment creation and self-help 
livelihood projects. Social reintegration support should involve community 
sensitisation, a reconciliation process, life skills and psychological support. 
These should be preceded by the reinsertion package, the support that ex-
combatants receive upon their demobilisation, as they await the 
comprehensive reintegration package. On the other hand, ex-combatants, 
those who passed the evaluations and received something from 
reintegration, felt that the offered packages did not change much of their 
lives. Ex-combatants were expecting to receive fees for their children, land 
(especially around Juba County), a loan scheme, clean water, medical care 
and a special health insurance scheme for the wounded heroes, among 
others (Turyamureeba, 2014). 
 Inclusion, participation and an individualised approach: It is 
generally expected that when deciding on the packages to come with DDR, 
specifically the reintegration element, stakeholders at the grassroots levels 
should be included. This was not the case in South Sudan as many ex-
combatants had missed out. One of the reasons leading to their missing out 
on DDR programmes was an ineffective communication system that saw 
the use of radio announcements which mostly reached urban and semi-
urban areas. 
 The nature of the implementation environment: The nature of the 
post-conflict environment is one of the key factors that determine the 
success of peace-building initiatives, such as DDR of ex-combatants or any 
weapons-reduction programme. In particular to South Sudan, the interim 
period was characterised by grave accusations between warring parties due 
to unresolved border issues, among other factors. Furthermore, ethnic 
tensions in South Sudan suffocated the DDR programme.  
 Other problems: Ex-SPLA women members were frequently marginalised 
by their families when they returned with offspring, but lacked a dowry. In 
32 
 
some cases, cultural and/or religious norms hindered reintegration by 
providing communities with justification to stigmatise ex-belligerents. 
(United Nations, 2007).  
2.11.4. An overview of DDR programmes in Southern Africa 
 
This section analyses DDR activities in Southern African countries. It focuses on 
case studies regarding DDR activities by South Africa and Namibia, the research 
focus of this study. As noted by Zena (2013), the way conflicts end has significant 
implications for subsequent disarmament. Accordingly, the way the Namibian 
conflict ended shares some similarities with those of fellow Southern African 
countries, namely South Africa and Zimbabwe. In addition, Namibia, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe share the near similar characteristic of having experienced 
armed conflicts as a result of racist and authoritarian governments.   
 
Nevertheless, DDR programmes in Southern Africa have had diverse results 
with some being innovative and remarkably successful. Others have been 
glaringly ineffective, with the result that many ex-combatants have been unable 
to secure employment and/or make the necessary social and psychological 
adjustments to make a successful transition to civilian life (Lamb, 2013). 
2.11.5 DDR: The case of South Africa 
 
2.11.5.1 South Africa’s historic background 
 
South Africans suffered oppression from fellow countrymen and -women 
following racial policies of segregation by the minority which gave birth to an 
apartheid regime in 1948.The African National Congress (ANC) was found in 
1961, with the aim of fighting oppression and the apartheid regime. The ANC 
political movement formed an armed wing, called Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK).Another group, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) a breakaway from the 
ANC, was formed; it established its own military wing, named Poqo that was 
later named renamed the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), to fight the 
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apartheid government as well. The ANC worked together with similar 
movements in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  
In 1991, after decades of conflict, nineteen parties agreed to come together to 
negotiate a peace process for the abolishment of the apartheid rule and establish 
democracy. The peace agreement was achieved in 1993. The parties set the 
election date and agreed to the integration of various armed forces to form the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The integration of MK and 
APLA was characterised by dissatisfaction over ranks and conditions of service, 
as some were forced to work without uniforms; there were other issues, such as 
salaries, as they were receiving lower salaries when compared to their white 
counterparts (Lamb, 2013). Lamb (2013) argues that many MK and APLA 
combatants were discouraged and/or prevented from pursuing military careers. 
They subsequently chose to benefit from demobilisation packages. 
2.11.5.2 Demobilisation in South Africa 
 
According to Lamb (2013), South Africa’s official demobilisation started in April 
1995. The ex-combatants, mainly from MK and APLA who were members of the 
SANDF but did not want or were unable due to physical challenges to serve in 
the full-time force, were asked to retire voluntarily from the army. By doing this 
the ex-combatants were given different packages. These included gratuities 
ranging from R12,734.00(US$3,499) to a maximum of R40,657.00 (US$11,156), 
two weeks of voluntary counselling and eighteen months of vocational training 
through the Department of Defence’s Service Corps (SC). 
The SC programme targeted to train close to 22,000 personnel between 1995 and 
2001; however, this target was not met as most ex-combatants went back to their 
impoverished communities. One of the reasons for abandoning the training 
included poor planning which did not take into consideration the ex-combatant’s 
existing skills and aspirations; furthermore, the training programmes were 
equipping ex-combatants with irrelevant skills or less marketable skills; tension 
existed between administrators who were MK soldiers from the SC Head Office 
and regional office administrators who were former SADF and TVBC soldiers. 
Lastly, the military culture within the SC undermined the culture of learning.  
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In addition, the South African parliament passed the Demobilisation Act for 
some SANDF members who could not be integrated because of their age, level of 
education, health or individuals who chose not to continue in the employment of 
the military because of dissatisfaction with their ranks after placement in the 
SANDF (Lamb, 2013). Also in 1996 the Special Pension Act No. 69 of 1996 
(which specifically targeted MK and APLA military veterans) was enacted to 
provide a modest pension to those former combatants who were 35 years or older 
on the commencement date of the Act, with monthly payments ranging from 
R500.00 to R5,000.00, depending on the age of the beneficiary (Lamb, 2013). 
While these were positive initiatives, research shows that these activities did not 
cater for, or reach out to, all the relevant ex-combatant.   
 
2.11.5.3. Reintegration 
 
Lamb (2013) claims that until 2008 both government and the ANC largely 
disregarded the plight of ex-combatants, despite rhetorical references to the 
heroes of the struggle in political speeches,. It was President Jacob Zuma who, 
upon entering office, created a military department and promulgated a Military 
Veterans’ Act, which was enacted in 2011 and implemented in 2012. These 
moves were made in part to address challenges faced by ex-combatants. Lamb 
(2013) identifies five studies that were conducted between the years 1993 and 
2006 on ex-combatants. It was noted that common problems faced by ex-
combatants were a result of the poor management of DDR programmes, among 
them demobilisation and reintegration. These problems included failure to find 
employment due to poor education and/or no skills, as well as a lack of work 
experience; some ex-combatants suffered from psychological problems; many ex-
combatants were experiencing major difficulties integrating into civilian life and 
perceived themselves as having been wished away as former superiors. Their 
respective communities tended to distance themselves from the people who not 
so long ago they urged into armed action. 
It was also noted that some ex-combatants were dependent on family members to 
provide them with money, food and shelter or were engaged in ad hoc,informal 
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sector activities, such as hawking, while some regularly abused alcohol. Another 
study reports high numbers of ex-combatants living with HIV/AIDS, with one in 
eight reportedly suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (Lamb, 2013). 
 
2.11.6 An overview of the DDR process in Namibia 
 
2.11.6.1 Namibia’s historical background before and after its 
independence 
 
Between 1884 and 1915 Namibia, then known as South West Africa (SWA), was 
a German colony. After the end of the First World War, the League of Nations 
tasked South Africa to administer Namibia to enable the Namibian people to 
exercise their right of self-determination. However, South Africa governed 
Namibia as its fifth province in conflict with the provisions of the UN mandate of 
trusteeship. There were no equal rights, and justice and democracy in Namibia 
for the black majority under South Africa control were limited (Ekandjo, 2013; 
2014, Lamb, 2013, Shityuwete, 1990).  
Ekandjo (2014) and Shityuwete (1990) maintain that the afore-mentioned 
situation forced the Namibian people to revolt against the abuse of their human 
rights by South Africa’s apartheid government.  This also led to the formation of 
the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the creation of 
SWAPO’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) to 
fight for Namibian self-determination (Shityuwete, 1990).In response, South 
Africa militarised the administration of Namibia and created a counter-
insurgency force, named the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) to 
counteract SWAPO insurgence. 
In 1966, the UN revoked South Africa’s mandate to rule Namibia and put 
Namibia under UN control in 1967.The UN created a body known as the UN 
Council for Namibia. This body was tasked to bring independence to Namibia 
until the time of self-determination. The Council was charged with governing 
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Namibia but it could not do so as it had no access to the territory, let alone 
control over the budget, civil service and security forces; hence, it was reduced 
tothe role of assisting refugees and exiles (Dzinesa, 2008; Lamb, 2011).  
In 1960the UN recognised SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
people of Namibia, and created a body called the United Nations’ Transitional 
Assistance Group (UNTAG). South Africa generally accepted the deployment of 
UNTAG, but disagreed with certain conditions. After prolonged negotiations, 
South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed an agreement in New York on 22 
December 1988 that was to bring peace to the entire region at last. The 
agreement laid down the timetable for the withdrawal of the forces of the 
signatory states and enabled the UN to implement its plan for independence for 
Namibia (Dzinesa, 2006; Ekandjo, 2014; Lamb, 2013). 
2.11.6.2 Namibia’s DDR process in context 
 
Dzinesa (2006) claims that as per Resolution 435, UNTAG’s main task was to 
oversee the peace process. Another function of UNTAG was to implement the 
DDR programme by monitoring the dismantling of the South African military 
presence and the confinement of SWAPO forces, as well as to monitor the orderly 
conduct of the process of independence. 
The UN played the main role in facilitating the return of Namibian refugees who 
were scattered all over the world. Reception centres were established to receive 
and register returnees and provide them with material assistance. By the end of 
the process, about 45,000 Namibians had been brought back from exile. These 
returnees did not spend a long time in reception centres due, in large part, to the 
assistance provided and to the resilient Namibian family structures which 
rapidly reabsorbed the returnees. On 21 March 1990, Namibia gained 
independence (Dzinesa, 2006; Lamb, 2013). 
Despite the fact that the process of the Namibian DDR went smoothly with few 
flaws, Dzinesa(2006) and Lamb (2013) claim that the reintegration programme 
was omitted from Namibia’s DDR programme because both the UN and the new 
Namibian government assumed that the ex-combatants would reintegrate into 
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the community on their own accord. They argued that the process of Namibia’s 
DDR programme was a success; however, the omission of the reintegration 
process undermined this. Soon after Namibia was declared an independent state 
in March 1990, the ex-combatants started to express their dissatisfaction due to 
the lack of employment opportunities. They started to express their grievances 
through public demonstrations and protest actions. 
In her bibliography, a decorated war heroin, Mukwahepo’s (Namhila, 2013), 
sentiments suggest the absence of the reintegration process and difficult times to 
come as she was quoted saying: 
In 1995, SWAPO sent me an invitation to attend the celebration of Heroes 
Day at Omugulugwoombashe, Omugulugwoombashe was SWAPO base 
where the first crossfire took place between SWAPO and South African 
forces”.  
Mukwahepo narrates her story in her own words as follows: 
“I was presented with a medal of honour. I felt good and I was proud. At 
this celebration, I met many comrades who were together with me in exile. I 
was very happy, and wished that the day and the ceremony would go on 
forever. However, as of course nothing lasts forever, the day came to an end 
and people departed for their homes. I too returned home to Onengali 
yaKaluvi with my medal of honour. My heart and soul was filled with the 
pride of recognition. Upon my return to my village, my fellow community 
members congratulated me for the recognition bestowed upon me by our 
SWAPO government. People greeted me with admiration and respect, 
saying ‘Mukwahepo’, you are a hero of our struggle. 
“But when I got back to my container, although my children looked at me 
with joy for their meme had been awarded a heroic medal- they were 
hungry and expected their hero to have brought them food I had returned 
home with a shiny medal, but I still did not have anything to cook for my 
children. I was a recognised national hero with an empty stomach. In 1991, 
I had registered with the government pension fund to receive a pension 
payout. Then in 1995, not long after I was awarded my medal, I started 
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receiving a monthly income of N$120, although it was only paid out every 
fourth month” (Namhila, 2013, p. 133-134). 
Mukwahepo’s story is similar to the story of Simeon Kaambo Shixungileni, a 
former commander of PLAN of SWAPO, as explained by his son. His views are 
related to sentiments highlighted in Mukwahepo’s bibliography. Simeon’s son 
was quoted saying:  
“Yes my father was poor and hungry but not that hunger that one feels in 
their stomach but the hunger that he could not support his family because 
of his age and ailing health”. 
Subsequently, the Namibian government was urged by community activists to 
carry out a fair and balanced reintegration programme. It was argued that the 
government had a social responsibility to its citizens. This call was prompted by 
the fact that the Cabinet was at first reluctant to consider pensions and cash 
payments for former combatants (Jauch, 2012). Jauch (2012) argued that the 
reintegration process, especially the compensation programme, was flawed and 
did not serve its purpose. Furthermore, Jauch (2012) states that the beneficiaries 
of this programme were now former freedom fighters who did not need 
assistance as they had well-paid jobs. This included the majority of cabinet 
members, as well as highly paid managers at parastatals and municipalities.  
The early omission of a reintegration process led to mass demonstrations, 
protests and disillusioned sentiments echoed by former soldiers and community 
activists regarding the poorly designed and implemented DDR approach. The 
former freedom fighters and their children had been staging demonstrations, 
demanding jobs and other social and financial benefits to which they thought 
that they were entitled. 
2.11.6.3The progress of Namibia’s reintegration programme 
 
In Namibia, twenty five years after Independence, the issue of a DDR 
programme, specifically the reintegration element, is a burning issue which 
refuses to die. The ex-combatants, famously known as ‘freedom fighters’ during 
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the liberation struggle, and their dependants have been staging demonstrations 
and protests demanding jobs, as well as compensation for their contribution to 
the liberation struggle.  
First it was the demonstrations and protests by ex-combatants themselves until 
2007 when the government started to engage in a dialogue with them. However, 
soon after the adult ex-combatants had stopped their protests, their children, 
including those of deceased ex-combatants, took to the streets in mass 
demonstrations, demanding to be granted veteran status as well. 
A pocket-sized number of SWATF and KOEVOET former soldiers had been 
meeting, issuing ultimatum statements demanding the same treatment, in order 
to be recognised as war veterans as well. They were stating that they too had 
been affected and that they felt that they too were war veterans; hence, they 
deserved to be treated equally. However, the government refused to grant them 
war veteran status, by saying that they had fought on the wrong side, with the 
enemy of the Namibian nation. All three groups, namely the freedom fighters, 
their dependants and ex-SWATF/KOEVOET and their families, continued to 
demand jobs and other social and financial benefits which they felt that they 
were owed by the state (Isaacs, 2007; Sibanda, 2008; Weidlich, 2007). 
2.11.6.4The benefits offered to ex-combatants under the government 
reintegration programme 
 
Since Independence, the Namibian government has taken the following 
initiatives to address the plight of war veterans: 
 The first initiative to assist veterans was the handing over of animals for 
animal husbandry purposes to some veterans. It is unfortunate that this 
programme did not benefit as many veterans as planned. 
 War veterans were given a pension of R120.00 which started around 
1995 and was paid every four months, according to Mukwahepo (2013). 
This amount was increased to R150.00 per month around 2000 and, in 
2004, it was again increased to R1, 000.00 per month. 
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 The second intervention was the creation of the Development Brigade 
(DBC) with the aim to empower veterans with skills development 
through training in the fields of agriculture and construction. 
 Then there was the introduction of the Social Integration Programme for 
Ex-Combatants (SIPE). The SIPE was created to contribute to the 
reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society by providing them with 
self-employment opportunities. This programme targeted the 12,000 
able-bodied, ex-combatants who had the potential to become economically 
active and who were registered by the Committee of Deputy Ministers. 
 The fourth intervention was the creation of the Peace Project. The Peace 
Project was born out of recommendations in the report of the Committee 
of Deputy Ministers in 1996. The purpose of this project was to integrate 
veterans into a number of public offices, such as the defense and police 
forces, the correctional services and state-owned enterprises. It was 
through this exercise that the Special Field Force, which is now under 
the Ministry of Safety and Security, was established, and many ex-
combatants, both PLAN and SWATF, were recruited to serve there.  
 
On the other hand, ex-combatants with specific qualifications were 
integrated into the civil service. It is encouraging to note that all the ex-
combatants that had been absorbed into different institutions still 
continue to benefit from these initiatives and their lives have improved 
considerably. 
 Then the establishment of the War Veterans’ Subvention Act which was 
promulgated in 1999 through which the War Veterans’ Trust Fund was 
created. The objective of the War Veterans’ Trust Fund was to pay a 
monthly subvention to war veterans and the dependants of deceased war 
veterans. Due to the lack of data on veterans, only a small proportion of 
the ex-fighters benefited from this fund. 
 The government also provided houses to some elderly and disabled PLAN 
fighters and former Robben Islanders. By 2010, ninety six (96) houses 
had been built; the programme was continuing and extended to other 
categories of veterans. The programme had managed to build about 2,000 
houses by 2015 (Shinovene, 2015). 
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 According to Nakale (2014) the Ministry of War Veterans’ Affairs 
registered about 26,000 war veterans who received one-off payments of 
N$50,000.00 or N$20,000.00, depending on the years they contributed to 
the liberation struggle. Another 10,303 war veterans, who were 
unemployed, retired or physically handicapped and veterans whose 
annual wage was about N$20,000.00 per annum, received a monthly 
grant of N$2,200.00 each. About 8,217 projects for the funding of studies 
and investments into SMEs for individual war veterans were approved 
and funded. 
 Nakale (2014) further claims that about 793 veterans and dependents of 
living and deceased veterans had been granted education grants and 61 
beneficiaries had graduated. Nakale (2014) also claims that the Ministry 
gave funeral assistance to 277 deceased veterans and had erected 243 
tombstones on the graves of the deceased war veterans by 2015. 
 However, despite the Ministry having provided the above-listed 
assistance, ex-PLAN fighters and their dependents continued to air their 
grievances that the government had failed to recognise them and take 
care of their wellbeing. This information was reported in thelocal media, 
documenting the plight of the ex-combatants. Meanwhile the Ministry’s 
website has also been reporting on the progress of their activities as per 
the mandate to address the plight of ex-combatants (Haufiku, 2014; New 
Era, 2016). 
2.11.6.5Registration process 
 
The Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs has gone through changes, and is now the 
Directorate of Veterans’ Affairs in the office of the Vice-President since President 
Hage Geingob took over the government on 21 March 2015. The Ministry of 
Veterans’ Affairs has outlined the process of registration of the veterans 
(Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs, 2013; Movagovna, 2016). The process is outlined 
as follows: 
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Registration of prospective veterans 
The entry point for the Ministry to channel its support programmes to veterans 
and dependents of veterans is registration. There are two main reasons for 
registration. The first reason is to enable the Ministry to capture and process the 
data of applicants so that prospective veterans are accorded veteran status by 
the Veterans’ Board. The second reason is to enable the government to establish 
the number of veterans and their dependents in the country and where they live, 
as well as their living conditions. 
According to Movagovna (2016), the government reported that during the 
2015/16 financial year, the directorate was allocated N$861 million to implement 
three programmes, namely the veterans’ welfare and development, liberation 
struggle heritage and coordination and support services. During the 2014/15 
financial year, it reported having spent an amount of N$844 million, resulting in 
an execution rate of 98 percent. 
Furthermore, about 21,112 applications were considered by the vetting 
committee, and the Veterans’ Board approved 1,442 and disapproved 2,758 
applications. This brings the total number of registered veterans since 2009 to 
26,124. 
Approval of prospective veterans 
Before the prospective veterans can begin benefitting from the various 
programmes and projects of the Ministry, they have to be accorded the status of 
veterans of the national liberation struggle as per the Veterans’ Act (No 2 of 
2008). The approval of prospective veterans and dependents of veterans is done 
by the Veterans’ Board, a body that is also entrusted to, amongst others, 
administer the Veterans’ Fund and approve benefits given to the veterans. 
Provision of financial assistance to veterans 
Financial assistance is aimed to improve the economic well-being of the veterans 
and dependents of veterans of the national liberation struggle. The financial 
assistance is provided in two packages: a once-off gratuity of fifty and twenty 
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thousand Namibian dollars (N$50,000.00or N$20,000.00), additional to this is 
the monthly subvention of two thousand Namibian dollars (N$ 2,000.00). 
A lump sum is paid to all registered veterans of the liberation struggle, 
regardless of their employment status. Veterans who began participating in the 
activities of the liberation struggle between 1959 and 1987 received a lump sum 
payment of fifty thousand (N$50,000.00) while veterans who began their 
liberation struggle activities between 1988 and 1989 were paid a lump sum of 
twenty thousand (N$20,000.00) Namibian dollars. 
A monthly subvention of two thousand Namibian dollars (N$2,000.00) is paid to 
unemployed veterans and to veterans whose monthly earnings are below the tax 
threshold. Of the twenty seven thousand registered veterans, 6,896 are eligible 
to receive the monthly subvention. 
Provision of psycho-social support 
 
Another mandate of the Ministry is to provide psycho-social support. The war of 
the national liberation struggle has left many veterans with various psycho-
social problems. Some veterans are either suffering from the post-traumatic 
effects of the war or are disabled. Moreover, veterans who are still fit to be 
employed find it difficult to secure meaningful employment in the post-colonial 
Namibia due to the fact that many have limited educational training. 
To care for the psycho-social needs of the veterans, the Ministry provides 
psychological counselling services and medical assistance. The Ministry has 
reported providing the following services between 2014 and 2015: 
 Medical and social health assessment of seven hundred and twenty (720) 
veterans. Of these veterans, six hundred (600) underwent medical 
examinations. The exercise made it possible for the Ministry to 
determine the number of veterans in need of medical assistance and the 
type of medical assistance they needed; 
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 Twenty-five (25) wheelchairs, forty-six (46) crutches, thirty-four(34) 
prosthetic devices, thirty-three (33) prosthetic socks and nine (9) pairs of 
spectacles were distribute to the veterans; 
 A stakeholders’ workshop on counseling services to share information 
that would enable the Ministry to work out a programme for counseling 
and create a referral system of veterans between the Ministry of 
Veterans Affairs (MoVA) and stakeholders was conducted.  
In terms of the provision of counseling services, veterans will receive psycho-
social counseling, spiritual counseling (self-healing and recovery), family 
(adoption) counseling, psycho-social rehabilitation and social reintegration into 
family and society. 
Assistance for formal and non-formal education 
 
Currently the Ministry is also committed to support the ex-combatants. The 
educational benefit assists all eligible veterans to attain acceptable levels of 
social and economic development. The educational and training grant is being 
paid to eligible veterans and dependants of veterans to pursue academic or 
vocational training at higher learning institutions in Namibia and within the 
SADC region. 
The amount of the grant to be allocated is paid as per local rates (Namibian 
dollars) and determined by the following points: registration and tuition (100 
percent as per the quote), accommodation and meals (40 percent of total costs), 
local transport (20 percent of the total costs), books (50 percent of total costs) and 
travelling expenses (100 percent of the cheapest mode of transport).The Ministry 
has reported to have provided study grants to two hundred and sixty four (264) 
veterans and their dependants studying at local tertiary and vocational training 
institutions between 2014 and 2015. 
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Construction of houses for veterans 
 
Another mandate of the Ministry by the government is to provide housing for the 
war veterans. The provision of proper housing is one of the initiatives taken by 
the Ministry to ensure that veterans are integrated in the country’s socio-
economic mainstream. 
There are three categories of veterans who are eligible for the housing benefit. 
These are the veterans who are old, disabled and those who are seriously ill. The 
houses provided by the Ministry consist of three bedrooms, a sitting room, a 
kitchen, bathroom, toilet and a veranda. The Ministry ensures that water and 
electricity are installed in all houses constructed for veterans. 
The Ministry has developed four house designs from which each eligible veteran 
can choose. The houses can be constructed at places of the veterans’ choice, 
provided that the area chosen is habitable. Between 2014 and 2015 the Ministry 
has done the following: 
 They conducted a veterans’ housing needs assessment in all 13 regions to 
identify veterans that were in need of housing assistance. This 
assessment was carried out on one hundred and sixty six (166) veteran 
housing applicants. Eighty-nine (89) veterans were recommended and 
seventy-seven (77) were not recommended for housing. Of the veterans 
recommended, seventy-seven (77) were recommended for the construction 
of houses and twelve were for the renovation of existing houses. 
 They verified the construction sites of veterans’ houses to ensure that 
veteran houses were not built at sites prone to floods. The verification of 
construction sites took place in twelve regions, excluding the Kunene 
region. To this effect, thirty-eight (38) sites earmarked for the 
construction of veterans’ houses were verified and found suitable. 
 Each house was built at the cost of four hundred and eighty-five 
thousand Namibian dollars(N$485,000.00). 
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Individual income generating projects for veterans 
In addition to the financial assistance provided to veterans, the Ministry is also 
funding individual projects for veterans. The projects are funded for an amount 
not more than two hundred thousand Namibian dollars (N$200,000.00). The 
funding of individual projects for veterans is meant to provide capital incentives 
to veterans aspiring to engage in economic activities that could help them to 
generate income for themselves and their families, as well as to assist 
government to attain the national development objectives set out in Vision 2030. 
This means that individual projects undertaken by veterans are expected to 
contribute ultimately to the country’s economic growth and reduce the 
unemployment rate in the country. 
Between 2014 and 2015 the Ministry received 600 applications from veterans. 
Due to a limited budget allocation, the Ministry only funded seventy-two (72) 
individual projects. As a result of this funding, some veterans are currently 
engaged in income-generating projects that are expected to improve their 
livelihood, contribute to economic growth and reduce unemployment. 
Funeral support 
 
According to Movagovna (2016), war veterans are also entitled to the provision of 
a funeral and a tombstone grant to ensure that registered veterans of the 
liberation struggle are accorded a respectable and dignified burial. 
2. 12.   Conceptual and theoretical framework 
2.12.1 The United Nation’s theoretical view of DDR 
 
The researcher used the Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) as the research 
framework as a guideline in this study.  
The UN is the leading institution in solving global challenges; it proposed an 
operational guideline for DDR. Such an instrument can be used to guide a 
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country’s DDR practices. This study makes an inquiry of the UN’s operational 
guidelines for DDR in an attempt to align Namibia’s DDR practices with the 
UN’s envisioned best practices. This theory was considered because the UN is 
heavily involved in peacekeeping operations and some DDR initiatives that give 
a better idea of what constitutes DDR (UN, 2014). The UN (2014) notes that 
DDR initiatives often fail because “in the past, DDR programmes were often 
carried out in a disjointed, unintegrated way due to poor coordination, planning 
and support, and sometimes competition between and among peacekeeping 
operations, agencies, funds and programmes” (p. 24). The UN’s operational 
guideline for DDR, as proposed in 2014, outlines the UN’s approach to DDR, 
explains circumstances for DDR, and defines the participants and beneficiaries.  
2.12.2 The scope of DDR according to the UN 
The UN (2014) concedes that the DDR process should be done after a conflict, 
with the aim of promoting security and stability. As such, the DDR focuses on 
supporting high-risk groups so that they become stakeholders in the peace 
process. Hence, the DDR has to be planned, coordinated, linked to security 
issues, focus on disarmament, weapon control and management, and also look 
into “national capacity-building, reconstruction and development in order to 
achieve the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants, encourage trust and 
confidence of communities receiving ex-combatants, and dealing with the root 
causes of conflict and be flexible and meet the needs of the country” (UN, 2014, p. 
26). The UN’s view of DDR adheres to some of the views proposed in the 
literature. However, efforts need to be made to understand the needs of the 
people of the relevant country and address root causes of the conflict. 
 
The UN reckons that the DDR is a formal political process that should be 
initiated by the groups that were in a conflict. These groups have to support 
DDR initiatives, and the UN is available to provide support with DDR 
implementation. The UN (2014) proposes that the overarching principle guiding 
the DDR process is that it should be people-centred, flexible, transparent and 
accountable, nationally owned, integrated and well-planned. 
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2.12.3 Post-conflict stabilisation, building and recovery framework 
 
The UN’s operational guideline for DDR outlines the context under which a DDR 
should be implemented; it stipulates the transition from a conflict and discusses 
how other humanitarian activities should be embraced within the DDR, as well 
as outlines a recovery planning framework suitable for DDR (UN, 2014). While 
the UN acknowledges that contexts of DDR can vary from one case to the other, 
it, however, acknowledges the existence of general characteristics that are 
normally associated with environments ready for a DDR programme. Situations 
warranting a DDR are characterised by countries with “weak governance 
institutions, lack social services and cohesion, have poor or malfunctioning 
economies, and are confronted with insecurity and lawlessness, including high 
levels of human rights abuse” (UN, 2014, p. 33). Focus should be on the political, 
social and economic environment and its overall security.   
 
In addition to specifying the context for DDR, the UN emphasises the need to 
pick out DDR initiatives within the whole transition. The UN identifies the DDR 
process and specifies steps to be followed as shown in Figure2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Implementing DDR during transition (UN, 2014, p. 37). 
 
The UN states, furthermore, that the DDR process should be linked to current 
humanitarian programmes and security reforms that are within the context. 
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These can come in the form of humanitarian assistance, peace-building and 
recover initiatives.  
 
 
2.12.4 Participants, beneficiaries and partners 
 
In addition to describing the scope of a DDR programme and the elements that 
encompass it, the UN also indicates the need to identify the participants, 
beneficiaries and partners. Thus, the groups to benefit from the DDR programme 
should be clearly defined. An eligibility criterion should guide the evaluation of 
those eligible to benefit from the DDR programme. 
 
Furthermore, the roles of local, national and international partners should be 
well defined within the DDR programme (UN, 2014). The UN recommends a 
well-monitored screening process based on detailed cross-examination of 
candidates. The UN (2014) also suggests that armed forces and groups, 
abductees, dependants; civilian returnees and communities should benefit from 
the DDR.  
2.13 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the development of DDR programmes in selected 
countries. It looked at how the scope and expected requirements of DDR 
programmes have evolved with time. The chapter, furthermore, looked at the 
beneficiaries of DDR which included direct and indirect beneficiaries. It also 
looked at the organs that initiate DDR programmes.  
An overview of DDR programmes in Africa was presented. The overview 
established that African countries had recorded both successes and failures in 
their implementation of DDR programmes. In particular, the lack of resources, 
conflicts and poor planning were among the factors that saw some DDR 
initiatives fail. An example of a failed DDR programme in South Sudan was 
reviewed.  
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In addition, the chapter also conducted a review of DDR programmes in 
Southern Africa. It was noted that there was a marked difference between 
consequences of failure to manage DDR programmes properly. While failure to 
manage DDR programmes led to instability and conflicts in part of Africa, the 
Southern African context, including Namibia, has yet to experience conflicts due 
to poor management of DDR programmes. 
Nevertheless, cases reviewed, for instance South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, 
show that compensation for ex-combatants grew and changed with time, 
following complaints or demonstrations. For instance, Namibia had temporarily 
halted the reintegration process and it took them close to two decades to 
establish a war veterans’ association, as well as the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs, 
to make provision for several packages. It was only after the election of President 
Zuma that South Africa established its War Veterans’ Association and Ministry 
in 2011. 
 
The study adopts the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) guidelines as the research framework as a 
point of reference to measure the success of the Namibia DDR programme.  
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the research methodology that was employed in this study. 
It aligns with the interpretivist research paradigm; hence, it used a qualitative 
case study design for data collection.This approach was useful in this study for 
obtaining information through using various techniques, such as face-to-face 
interviews and focus group discussions. 
3.2 Research design 
 
A research design is a plan of how the research is going to be conducted, 
indicating who or what will be involved, and where and when the study will take 
place (Berg & Gall, 2001). Accordingly, this section identifies the unit of analysis 
and research instrument, as well as the steps or procedures that were followed 
during data collection and analysis. 
3.3 Unit of analysis 
 
This study identified former PLAN fighters or ex-combatants as its unit of 
analysis. Thus, the population of this study was the former freedom fighters now 
known as the veterans of the Namibia liberation struggle, living in the Windhoek 
district; however, in cases where the researcher felt that it was important for 
this study to interview an important key informant who lived outside of 
Windhoek, the research process was flexible enough to consider such cases.  
A population is any group of individuals that have one or more characteristics 
that are of interest to the researcher in common (Best & Khan, 1993). Another 
definition by Polit and Beck (2004) refers to a research population as the entire 
group or unit of analysis, whom the researcher is interested in for research 
purposes.  
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The target population refers to all the objects from which one would be likely to 
generalise the findings of the study. The target population of this study were 
men and women of all age groups who were former freedom fighters per the 
definition of the Namibia Veterans’ Act. Windhoek is the capital of Namibia and 
this city was selected because it seems to accommodate people from different 
backgrounds.  
3.4 Sample size and sampling method 
 
Dukes (1984) recommends the sampling of 3-10 subjects. This study had a 
sample of 20 ex-combatants, which included key informants, who fought in the 
Namibia liberation struggle and were disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated 
within the period of 1989 to 2015. The key informants were activists and leaders 
of civil organisations. 
The study used purposive and snowball sampling techniques. Purposive 
sampling is used in qualitative research and is entirely governed by the need to 
develop additional theories in social science. In purposive sampling, the 
researcher selects a sample that could be judged to be representative of the total 
population. This judgement is made on the basis of available information or the 
researcher’s knowledge of the population. Purposive sampling is less complicated 
and more economical (in terms of time and financial expenses) than probability 
sampling (Du Plooy, 2002). 
Saunders (2007) explains that snowball sampling is a technique that involves 
finding other potential respondents who have the required characteristics. This 
meant that the researcher identified the first five war veterans from the War 
Veterans’ Association and those known to her; they, in turn, identified other war 
veterans until a sample of 20 people was reached. 
The researcher approached the office of the Veterans’ Association, as well as the 
Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs, explained the purpose of this study and asked for 
permission to access the data base of the registered war veterans in order to 
interview them regarding the subject under discussion. After the first five had 
been chosen from the data base, the researcher asked them to refer her to other 
ex-combatants known to them. 
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3.5 The research instrument 
 
This research used triangulation for data collection to gather data with thick 
descriptions. researchgate.net (2016) defines triangulation as a way of using 
more than one approach to the investigation of a research question in order to 
enhance confidence in the ensuing findings which involves different types of 
samples as well as methods of data collection. Neuman (1997) describes 
triangulation as a process to capture different dimensions of the same 
phenomenon. Furthermore, triangulation is described as a method used by 
qualitative researchers to check and establish the validity of their research by analysing 
research question from multiple perspectives to arrive at consistency across data sources or 
approaches. 
Interviews, observations and document analysis were used to collect data. Face-
to-face and semi-structured interviews were used because previous studies 
indicated that former combatants might not feel comfortable to discuss and air 
their opinions in the presence of others; however, they appeared to be more open 
and ready to give their opinions in the absence of people they trusted (Jomo, 
2006; Namibia Human Rights Society, 2006; Sibeene, 2006; Weidlich, 2006). 
Furthermore, Cresswell (2003) states that face-to-face interviews provide rich 
data and offer the opportunity to establish rapport between researcher and 
participant. 
3.6 Procedure for data collection 
 
The interviews were conducted by the researcher. Participants were first 
contacted to set-up an appointment with the interviewer. Interviews were 
conducted at the site selected by the interviewee or at any other location to the 
convenience of the interviewee. This method was selected to allow participants to 
express their views, feelings, emotions and experience regarding the 
reintegration process. Furthermore, by using interviews as a data collection 
method it also enabled the researcher to observe the body language of the 
participants and probe for further elaboration of answers.  
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Since the study employed snowball and purposive sampling, respondents did not 
sign a consent form and the researcher did not experience resentment from the 
respondents, nor did any respondent withdrew from the research. All the 
respondents indicated their willingness to participate in the study and could 
refer the researcher to other respondents in the same category. Some 
participants suggested that the researcher go to the army barracks to approach 
more war veterans for interviews. Some suggested being interviewed in groups; 
however, due to limited time available, that could not happen.  
A note book was used instead of a tape recorder because respondents were 
uncomfortable with being recorded. Before the commencement of the interview, 
the researcher introduced herself, stated the purpose of the interview and 
assured participants that the information obtained would be strictly confidential.  
The researcher sought permission to take notes during the interview. To 
facilitate the research process, a letter was obtained from the University of 
Witwatersrand (See Appendix). 
3.7 Data analysis and interpretation 
 
Data analysis is the aspect of qualitative research that differentiates it from 
quantitative research. The first step is to explore the data. This aspect is known 
as exploratory analysis in qualitative research where the researcher writes down 
ideas and thinks about how to organise the data in text segments or themes 
(Cresswell, 2008). 
Neuman (1997) points out that qualitative data can be stored in a variety of 
formats, but the primary format of storing qualitative data is in text format, for 
example, data such as field notes, transcribed interviews and other documents, 
for instance, personal dairies. The text-based data in this study are 
unstructured, open-ended and non-quantitative.   
The first requirement of analysis is to organise the data by bringing some order 
to give structure to the research. On this basis, data were analysed and 
organised to give meaning to the findings. Open coding was employed during 
data analysis to data which were gathered from individual subjects to establish 
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emerging themes. Open coding means labelling concepts, as well as defining and 
developing categories based on their properties and dimensions. It is used to 
analyse qualitative data(Research Rundowns, 2009).  
The researcher chose to use the open coding method in order to identify the 
concepts emerging from the raw data and later group them into conceptual 
categories. The rationale behind this was to build a descriptive, multi-
dimensional, preliminary framework for later analysis. Another important 
aspect for choosing an open coding method was because the concepts built 
directly from the raw data; therefore, the process itself ensured the validity of 
the work. 
Cross-case data analysis was done next, where similarities and differences 
between findings from different subjects/cases/participants were compared. 
Cross-case data analysis is a method used in qualitative research. Neuman 
(1997) explains cross-case analysis as a research method that can mobilise 
knowledge from individual case studies. In this study, the researcher employed 
this method by studying the bibliographies of the Namibia war veterans. 
3.7 Validity and reliability 
3.7.1 Validity 
 
 
Sarantakos (1998) and Kvale (1996) state that validity means the 
trustworthiness of the statement and the ability to produce findings that are in 
agreement with theoretical or conceptual values. Accordingly, the study relied on 
multiple sources of information during data collection to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the research findings. Different participants were engaged 
and different sources of data were considered to enhance the credibility of the 
study’s findings. These included interviews, document analysis and observations. 
Furthermore, in-depth interviews were conducted by using probing questions in 
order to enable respondents to give elaborated answers and make them think in-
depth about the subject. The research participants were also invited to comment 
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on previous taken notes during the data collection and after the data had been 
analysed to ensure validity. 
3.7.2  Reliability 
 
Reliability is the extent to which a study procedure produces similar results 
under constant conditions on all occasions (Bell, 1996; Yin, 2003). A data 
collection protocol was adhered to ensure a precise approach to data collection. 
Furthermore, the author maintained honesty in the conducting of the study and 
reporting of findings. The study employed a qualitative approach; hence, validity 
and reliability were ensured by triangulation. This was achieved by doing field 
observations during the data collection and content analysis by reading 
bibliographies of the war veterans, for example, the bibliography of Mukwahepo, 
Woman, soldier, mother, by Namhila (2013). 
3.8 Ethical considerations 
 
According to Polit and Beck (2010), researchers must deal with ethical issues 
when their intended research involves human beings. The researcher followed 
the University’s procedures and applied for ethical clearance from the Human 
Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical) to conduct the research and data 
collection.  
Participants were assured of confidentiality and anonymity through a written 
pledge. The names of the participants will not be revealed or mentioned due to 
the sensitivity of the subject. Saunders (2007), argues that, in order to retain the 
value of qualitative research while safeguarding the right and confidence of the 
subjects, the researcher must use pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of the 
respondents involved. All raw data and individual responses are stored securely 
by the researcher and will not be divulged to anyone, nor will the reporting of 
findings be done in a manner that allows for an easy identification of 
participants. Furthermore, subsequent use of data will not be done without 
permission (Saunders, 2007).  
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3.9 Delimitations of the study 
 
The study looked at the issues concerning the DDR practice in Namibia, as per 
the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards 
(IDDRS) set out by the United Nations on the basis of lessons learned from DDR 
in various cases. The study took note that at the time of Namibia’s imitation of 
DDR in 1989 to 1990, the first two components were implemented to a certain 
extent, leaving the reintegration process unattended. With the reintegration yet 
to be completed, the currently available IDDRS suggest that Namibia has to 
adhere to the new standards in relation to reintegration (United Nations, 2014).  
 
The study looked at what was done after the former combatants had returned 
from exile to integrate them into civilian life, and what their expectations were 
compared to reality. It assessed whether their expectations were feasible or not, 
and if their expectations were feasible, why these were not met. The study did 
not look at other economic issues that did not directly concern the war veterans, 
also known as former freedom fighters (United Nations, 2014). The question of 
the former SWATF and the South West Africa Police Counter Insurgency Unit 
(KOEVOET) troops of the apartheid-era SADF were not addressed in this study.  
3. 10 Summary  
 
This chapter discussed the type of study conducted and the research methods 
used during the study. The population was identified and the sample, selected 
from the total population according to purposive and snowball sampling, was 
described. The research instrument and the site of data collection (the Khomas 
Region in Windhoek) were explained. Data coding and presentation by means of 
computerised programmes, as well as the analysis of data done by the 
researcher, were discussed.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 FINDINGS REGARDING THE PERSPECTIVES ABOUT THE 
REINTEGRATION PROCESS BY FORMER FREEDOM FIGHTERS 25 
YEARS AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore the expectations, views and opinions of 
the war veterans regarding the DDR process in terms of compensation. This 
chapter explains the contributions to the aims of the study as it presents the 
findings from data collected by using the research methodology described in the 
previous chapter.  
 
Data are presented, starting with the biographic data of the participants. This is 
followed by an outline of findings about what ex-combatants had received, as 
well as their expectations. 
 
4.2  Biographic data 
 
Twenty (20) ex-combatants participated in this study. The majority of 
participants were male ex-combatants. Of the total participants,15% were 
females while male participants constituted 85%,as shown in Figure 1.All 
participants were born between 1955 and 1965. The majority (5) of the 
participants were born in 1957, followed by 3 who were born in 1960. Figure 1 
shows the date-of-birth distribution across participants.  
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Figure 1: Gender and age distribution across participants 
 
In addition, the collected data showed that ex-combatants had joined the 
liberation war at ages ranging between 15 and 22 years. While those who were 
born in 1955 went to war at the age of 22, the average age of those who were 
born after 1955 and joined the liberation struggle was constantly dropping to its 
lowest of 15 years in 1965. Figure 2 shows these findings. 
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Figure 2: Average age of joining the liberation struggle 
 
Given that most ex-combatants joined the liberation struggle when they were 
still young, it is interesting to note that the majority (65%) of them were still 
going through their secondary education at the time they joined. Of the 
participants,25% had working contracts at the time of joining the liberation 
struggle while 10% of the total participants were neither working nor learning.  
Figure 3 presents these findings. 
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Figure 3: Occupations and qualifications of ex-combatants prior to 
joining the liberation struggle 
4.3  Factors for joining the liberation struggle 
 
Data regarding factors that motivated ex-combatants to join the liberation 
struggle were collected. The data were gathered through interviews and 
document analysis. Through content analysis and subsequent coding, the 
emerging motivational factors that appeared to reflect a similar motivational 
force were grouped together and given an umbrella term.  
 
The emerging themes that appeared to motivate the ex-combatants were 
categorised into oppression and fighting for equal rights, SWAPO’s mobilisation 
and unifying force against the apartheid regime, the belief of invisibility and 
winds of change. These motivational factors are discussed below. 
4.3.1  Oppression and fight for equal rights 
 
The then ruling apartheid regime oppressed the native Namibians through its 
minority rule and discrimination. This resulted in the locals being exposed to 
harsh treatment.  
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As a result, Namibians believed that once they had liberated the country, all the 
Namibian people would have their human rights and dignity restored. For 
instance, some Namibians did not like the inferior Bantu education offered in 
black schools; hence, they felt that liberating Namibia would give them a better 
education. 
4.4.2  SWAPO’s mobilisation and unifying force against the apartheid 
regime 
 
Findings from data collected suggest that SWAPO’s mobilisation campaigns 
encouraged men and women to take up arms to fight against the colonial 
occupation in Namibia. SWAPO came in as a unifying force, uniting the once 
divided Namibians against one enemy – the apartheid regime. As such, SWAPO 
diverted attention from tribal fights and disputes over livestock, land and 
valuable assets. The spirit of unity of SWAPO as a unifying force to mobilise all 
the indigenous groups in Namibia was inspired by the forefathers under the 
leadership of their kings and chiefs, such as king Mandume Ndemufayo, King 
Nehale Lya Mpingana and Ipumbu yaShilongo, who fought in northern Namibia 
to stop German, Portuguese and South African forces from occupying Namibia; 
other chiefs fought in central and southern Namibia, notably chief Hendrik 
Witbooi, Jakob Murenga and chief Hosea Kutako.  
 
4.4.3  The belief of invisibility 
 
There was a general belief that freedom fighters were trained, cooked by means 
of magic and became invisible in such a way that if the enemy wanted to attack 
them, they would disappear. Therefore, some felt convinced by this belief and 
went to join the liberation struggle.  
 
They thought that one day they would receive training and attain the magical 
powers of disappearance. They could thus fight the enemy who would not be able 
to harm them, since they would be invisible. 
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4.4.4  Winds of change 
 
The winds of change also motivated Namibians to join the liberation struggle. 
Thus, the winds of change sweeping across Africa and that saw many countries 
liberated, inspired some ex-combatants. Interviews indicated that they used to 
attend secret meetings where the politics of Africa was discussed; this included 
the politics of Namibia that was still under occupation. They also listened to the 
radio broadcasts in Namibia which, among other issues, spread the message of 
how other African countries were being liberated from their colonialisers. One 
ex-combatant expressed how motivated they were at the time to fight for their 
independence by stating that:  
 
“There was no need to ask others to fight for us, as we were brave enough to 
do so ourselves, but we gratefully accepted the assistance of other countries 
to enable us to liberate our beloved country.” – Respondent X018 
4.5 War experiences and the feelings after war 
 
This section presents findings regarding ex-combatants’ experiences in war and 
how they felt in terms of their contribution to Namibia. It was interesting to note 
during data collection that ex-combatants were enthusiastic and open to tell 
their stories about how they had fought the war and what were their victories 
and setbacks.  
 
The stories of former freedom fighters were a mix of happy and sad moments.  It 
is these stories that distinguish former freedom fighters from other Namibia ex-
soldiers who were involved in the Namibia liberation war, as theirs was a self-
sacrificing and voluntarily contribution to a national cause. 
 
4.6 Facing imminent death on the battle front 
 
The liberation war was fought by both men and women. During the data 
collection, two women respondents narrated stories of how they participated in 
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the war battles in the front lines along with their male counterparts. They told 
how many of them died while fighting. They vividly remembered one big battle, 
called ‘Omatemba battle’. They said that that battle was very significant in the 
history of PLAN battles because many of their comrades lost their lives when 
many women freedom fighters died in the battle. It was a battle that was fought 
on 26 January 1981. They claimed that they were about sixty women soldiers in 
that battle but at the end of the offensive only twenty-six of them had survived 
and thirty-four had been sacrificed. Some of the ex-combatants told how they 
miraculously survived the Cassinga Camp attack in 1978, the Omatemba battle 
in 1982 and the well-known battles of Quito Cunavale, Mavinga and Cahama 
that took place in 1987.  
 
The women ex-combatants were proud of having participated in the front lines of 
the battle. When they returned home after Independence, it seemed that no-body 
who knew them, knew that they were women combatants who shared trenches 
along with their male counterparts.  
 
4.7 Feeling of achievement 
 
Findings from the data collected suggest that ex-combatants were very proud of 
having participated in the liberation struggle, and for them Namibia’s 
independence was an indication that they had fulfilled their country’s mission. 
According to the ex-combatants, the participation in the liberation struggle was a 
requirement for many former freedom fighters, and a goal that they had set 
themselves, because the country had to be liberated from the yoke of colonialism. 
The young people had to take part in this process, and it was these young people 
of the time who had to emancipate Namibia, its land and its people.   
 
Some of the former freedom fighters expressed their lack of regret for 
participating in the liberation struggle. They were prepared to die to allow their 
motherland to be independent from colonial domination so that their future 
generations would live in peace and tranquility. They hoped that their 
contribution had made a difference in bringing about the sovereignty of Namibia 
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in the world-wide community of nations. However, despite the feeling of having 
accomplished their mission, there was one aspect that they did not appreciate 
and that was the reintegration process. 
 
One ex-combatant explained his feelings about Namibia’s independence: 
“It pleased me when I saw the hoisting of the Namibian flag on 21st March 
1990 at Independence Stadium in Windhoek. It was a good night for me. I 
said to myself that the mission was fulfilled, although I was very much 
aware that this was political independence and there was still a second 
phase of economic independence to come. To achieve this, the country had 
to prepare the groundwork: first, to achieve political emancipation; second, 
to have political stability and peaceful coexistence. With these in place 
would come the ability to attract honest investors who could help the 
economy grow”. 
 
4.8  Challenges facing the ex-combatants 
4.8.1  The forgotten ones 
 
Some of the former freedom fighters felt that they had been forgotten. It was 
indicated that some well-known commanders who commanded the war in the 
front line had since been forgotten after the demobilisation, and were living in 
abject poverty. To support this sentiment, they gave an example of how the 
government had been conferring medals, but the heroic actions of many known 
former ex-combatants were still to be recognised. 
 
In addition, there was a feeling among other ex-combatants that, when the 
SWAPO leadership took over the new government, they forgot about them to the 
extent that some ex-combatants were denied the status of being war veterans; 
SWAPO’s view at the time was that no-one was invited to join the liberation 
struggle against their will (Namibia Human Rights Society, 2006; Namibia Sun, 
2014). One ex-combatant, with a face full of scars from shrapnel, demoralised by 
his vulnerable condition, remarked that: 
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“If we will ever have another war many of us we will not participate our 
former colleague in leadership are treating us unfairly”.  
 
These remarks by ex-combatants and Anonymous (2007, August 6) show that 
some ex-combatants were not satisfied with the manner in which they were 
being treated but suffered in silence. The war veterans’ bibliographies and 
interviews with the media indicated a different picture which showed the 
inequality and poverty among the war veterans of different categories.  
 
There was a category of war veterans who had been ordinary foot soldiers and a 
group of elite veterans who had been political prisoners, political leaders or 
commanders. Others played a crucial role in diplomacy by negotiating self-
determination for Namibia, and mobilising resources for the liberation 
movement. The stories of the former category were about the difficult battles 
they had fought where some of their fellow soldiers had sacrificed their lives; 
after independence, instead of having a better life, they were facing challenges, 
such as poverty and negligence by the government under the leadership of 
politicians who had spent their youth fighting against inequality and injustice. 
The latter, on the other hand, were silent on challenges, such as poverty. Their 
stories were more about self-glory and how they had fought relentlessly to 
liberate the country.  
4.8.2 Physiological challenges after the war 
 
The ex-combatants were still finding it difficult to forget all the violence of war: 
the fighting, the deaths of comrades, the fear of battles and the loneliness of 
being separated from their families. They spoke about how they had many 
dreams and nightmares about the struggle for independence. They talked about 
their fear of being betrayed, feelings of mistrust of their own comrades and the 
Cubans. When they returned from war, at first they mistrusted their families 
because they did not know who their enemies were and who their friends; they 
mistrusted almost everybody, for example, the UN at the implementation of 
Resolution 435, since at one time the UN had given South Africa permission to 
attack PLAN fighters (Shipanga, 2012). 
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Reports of their fellow comrades’ deaths after the war haunted them, because ofa 
lack of clarity on the causes of their deaths. They did not know whether the 
deaths were natural or as a result of fighting. Culturally, people, especially those 
of the Awambo culture, cry when someone has passed away. This was not really 
practised during the war, especially in the front lines. When a comrade had died, 
especially on the battlefield, it gave morale and determination to the rest of the 
comrades to fight even harder to defeat the enemy. The deaths of their comrades 
reminded them that they had to continue fighting to the last PLAN combatant. 
They never thought of giving up, because giving up the liberation struggle would 
have been a betrayal of their sacrifices. They had the conviction that it was very 
important to follow in the footsteps of their forefathers, and emulate the bravery 
that enabled them to give their precious lives to the struggle for the 
emancipation of Namibia. 
4.8.3 Lack of equal job opportunities 
 
After the independence celebrations in 1990, some ex-combatants were employed 
while others could not find any employment. This put a huge burden on the 
relatives who were supporting the returning ex-combatants. One ex-combatant 
stated that when they went to war in their youth as boys and girls and returned 
as grownups, some of them had added to their families. Hence, on their return, 
their families started treating them as outcasts.  
“They started to question us, why some of our former PLAN fighters and 
colleagues were given employment but some did not. We also noted that 
some of our former colleagues have started to avoid us when we meet or 
want to see them in their offices. We would be told that we have to make 
appointments if wanted to see them”. 
 
One ex combatants exclaimed: 
“Imagine your age mate, neighbor, a school mate before you went into 
exile, you left on the same day, trained as soldiers together and spent 
years in exile, fight in the same battle front lines and you were repatriated 
the same date but now you are unemployed but he is employed and holding 
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a high rank in the force. This was painful and impossible to explain to our 
families”. 
 
These claims agree with Mukwahepo’s life, the first Namibian woman to join 
SWAPO in exile and to be trained as a soldier. She indicated that since 
Independence she had been jobless and without an income. She went further to 
state that not only did she have no income, she also survived everyday like a 
bird, not knowing where her next meal would come from. These sentiments did 
not agree with most ex-combatants’ hopes and views that the new government 
was going to take care of its people after the war.  
 
On the other hand, those who secured jobs did not secure these soon after the 
war, and even those with jobs were paid relatively low salaries. One cx-
combatant started working for remuneration in 1990; the majority of them 
started between 1996 and 1997, after mass demonstrations where they 
demanded employment. The lowest paid employee was receiving N$300.00 and 
the highest paid was earning N$1200.00 per month. One respondent had been 
earning N$300.00 from 1990 until 1997 when he started to earn N$800.00 per 
month. Since 1990, he had been working as a constable in the police and he was 
promoted to the rank of a sergeant only three years ago. He told the researcher 
that there were many others in his situation, and all of them were about to retire 
the following year, 2017. Respondent X010 wanted the researcher to meet all 
these former fighters; however, due to time constraints this was not possible. 
4.8.4 Alcohol abuse 
 
Alcoholism is another serious problem that affected the ex-combatants. Most of 
the ex-combatants interviewed stated that many of their former colleagues 
became alcoholics. Alcoholism, they claimed, escalated because of the lack of 
economic opportunities, poor living standards and unemployment.  
 
According to the former freedom fighters, when some of them realised that their 
hope of securing employment was unrealisable, they started abusing alcohol. 
They also became hopeless and suicidal. They claimed to know many of their 
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former colleagues who had committed suicide due to the poor economic positions 
in which they found themselves. They somehow felt betrayed by the system, 
which aimed to bring equality, fairness and prosperity to all the Namibian 
people, something for which they had fought. Their families also started to 
disrespect them and regarded them as failures. They questioned how it was 
possible that their former colleagues were employed and prospering, while, on 
the other hand, they remained at home as beggars. Namibia has since been 
recording a high rate of suicide, a phenomenon with causes that are yet to be 
found. 
 
4.8.5 Poverty and negligence of ex-combatants’ children 
 
Some of the ex-combatants were of the opinion that the issue of the ‘children of 
liberation struggle’, also known as ‘struggle kids’, was a result of the delayed or 
poor implementation of the reintegration programme. They claimed that many 
children were the victims of their parents’ poverty, the former freedom fighters 
who could not afford to look after their children due to their unemployment and 
low income.  
 
Another factor that the government failed to address was taking care of the 
children of their fallen comrades during the war. This also included a lack of 
guidance and counseling that saw some children lacking discipline as a result of 
the abnormal environments in which they were living at the refugee camps. This 
is also confirmed in Mukwahepo’s bibliography: 
“The unemployed father of these two children tried hard to get money to 
pay for their school fees, uniform and books. He was helpful. I could see how 
poverty was holding him back from fulfilling his fatherly role. He did not 
have a house of his own, but lived with his young brother. I can tell you 
from experience that it is the crying shame for adults in our society not to 
have their own dwelling place. I could really feel his frustration when he 
said that he was tired of being a dependent. His young brother was 
responsible for all his basic needs. His situation was unbearable”. 
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4.8.6 The Namibia war veterans’ perception regarding compensation 
 
The ex-combatants expressed different views regarding their expectations of 
compensation. The majority of ex-combatants felt that they deserved to be 
compensated as former freedom fighters, while some felt that to be compensated 
for their contribution to the liberation struggle was impossible, because that 
would never be enough. 
 
The Namibian freedom fighters were split into two groups about the use of the 
term ‘compensation’. The majority of the ex-combatants felt that they deserved to 
be compensated for their contribution to liberating Namibia from colonial rule. 
But there were those who felt that the term, ‘compensation’, was not appropriate 
because the money they were receiving would never be enough for what they had 
done to bring freedom to their country. They thought that it was good that the 
government was giving ex-combatants some cash funds, but it should not be 
regarded as ‘compensation’ as per the dictionary meaning of the word. According 
to these ex-combatants, the payout should be regarded as assistance to the ex-
combatants to enable them to reintegrate into civilian life.  
 
The ex-combatants went further to elaborate how the perception of compensation 
started. This wasas close as this study could get to the bottom of information 
regarding the reasons why the ex-combatants started demanding compensation. 
The ex-combatants explained that it seemed as if they misunderstood the 
operational budget that was setup by the UN in order to implement Resolution 
435. The ex-combatants explained that the UN estimated a budget and planned 
that each repatriated or displaced person from Namibia would cost about 
US$30,000 to be repatriated and reintegrated. This cost included the air 
transport of the refugees. 
 
Respondent 018, therefore, suspected that people were misinformed about this 
amount of money and a rumour started to go around when they found 
themselves in a dire situation as a result of the poor planning and 
implementation of the reintegration programme. The study made some attempt 
to confirm and obtain clarification from the leader who organised the mass 
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demonstrations in 2006. Unfortunately she explained to the researcher that she 
was no longer giving interviews. Meanwhile this rumour of US$30,000.00 owed 
to ex-combatants continued to make its rounds. While the researcher was going 
around, she could overhear ex-combatants telling each other about the 
whereabouts of these funds and who was involved in the deviation of funds, a 
process that had deprived the intended owners by investing the money 
somewhere else. 
 
The ex-combatants were then asked to state the challenges they faced in the 
integration process. They were also asked to rank these in a priority order, 
starting from the most pressing ones to the least pressing ones. Among the 
challenges listed were land, housing, low income, low savings, high cost of living, 
poor or a lack of education for themselves and their children, poor health or the 
lack of access to health facilities, a lack of information and poor customer care 
when they visited service providers.  
4.8.7 Land ownership 
 
Fourteen of the ex-combatants interviewed expressed their concern about land 
scarcity. The ex-combatants stated that one of the reasons they took up weapons 
to fight against the colonial rulers was to get back the land that was 
concentrated in a few of the minority white hands. However, 25 years after 
Independence, they still did not have land to settle on. They deplored the 
government for not doing enough to address the land issue and creating an 
enabling environment for ex-combatants to obtain land, both in communal and 
commercial areas.  They stated that when they applied for land from their 
village headmen, the headmen sometimes did not welcome them and were 
hesitant to give them land; therefore, they faced discrimination in the allocation 
of land in their communities. In a meeting between the headmen and the 
Governor of the Omusati Region, the headmen complained about the war 
veterans as they were mostly the people causing conflict in the community 
because, since they were the ones who had liberated this country, they now felt 
that they were entitled to take any land they wanted(New Era, 2016). 
 
71 
 
Contrary to this view, the former combatants felt differently. Respondent X09 
complained that they were facing many challenges in order to acquire land. They 
also felt that the community did not accept them very well. For example, if one 
made his or her own efforts to acquire land, he or she would face challenges from 
the community and sometimes from government as well. Either the government 
would question from which region in Namibia they originated or the community 
would claim that they were taking their land and then use their political power 
to chase them away. Respondent X09 is quoted saying: 
“The community do not like us, they discriminate us because of our status 
of being ex- combatants”. 
 
The prospect of owning land in commercial areas was also limited for the ex-
combatants. In the first place, they could not afford to buy land in commercial 
areas, and, secondly, the government resettlement programme did not give any 
preferences to ex-combatants; hence, it was very difficult to meet the 
requirements to qualify for the government resettlement programme. Ex-
combatants were made to compete with everyone else, and sometimes it was 
difficult to meet the resettlement criteria. The major conditions for one to secure 
a farm were that beneficiaries should be able to farm, as well as have a 
background in agriculture or other related activities on which the resettlement 
was based. 
 
Even if the ex-combatants were to secure land, they faced the following 
challenges due to limited resources: 
 They did not have the means to develop the given land to set up the 
necessary infrastructure and to buy agricultural equipment in order to 
develop the resettlement farms.  
 They lacked capital to stock the farms. 
 People were not allowed to bring in the animals they owned in communal 
areas from behind the red line (a line that disallows farmers from the 
former Bantustans, namely Caprivi, Kavango and Owamboland, to move 
livestock to commercial farms).  
 The small pieces of land being allocated comprised 20 hectare per 
household. They felt that this policy was very discriminating because 
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those people who obtained land before Independence and the well-
connected individuals were allowed to keep larger tracks of land, bigger 
than 20 hectares.  
 
4.8.8 Housing and accommodation 
 
Housing was a second challenge, according to the ranking. The ex-combatants, 
especially those with a low income, complained bitterly about the lack of housing. 
The researcher found that many of the ex-combatants were employed in the 
police and army. The army and police forces were some of the lowest paid sectors 
in the country. Most of the ex-combatants were accommodated in bases and 
police camps where they lived in small, crowded, single rooms, and they had to 
share bathrooms and a kitchen. This condition compromised their hygiene and 
privacy. The buildings were also dilapidated and needed renovation. These 
buildings would not even pass the lowest required standards for buildings that 
are suitable for dwelling by human beings. 
 
Most of those who happened to have houses lived in poor suburbs, specifically in 
Katutura, an area that was reserved for blacks only during the colonial era. 
Those who either never secured government accommodation or who wanted to 
live on their own to maintain their privacy, opted to put up shacks made from 
iron sheets and all kinds materials at their disposal in the periphery of the town 
where, in some areas, they had no electricity, water and ablution facilities or 
they had to share these facilities with other households. Respondent X017, who 
spent his youth in exile in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola, had this to say: 
“Look where I live, yet I am the one who guards the houses of our political 
leaders, they have luxuries houses. These are people who we were together 
in the exile (liberation struggle) and they know me very well. When we are 
travelling with them or go to guard their houses they invite me in their 
houses and at their tables, but after that I return back here, look where I 
live. I am about to go on retirement next year. I do not even have a dream 
to own a house anymore because if I apply for housing they tell me that I 
am too old to qualify and I cannot afford to pay. I cannot even afford to buy 
73 
 
a plot let alone building a proper home. After I am retired I will go back to 
my rural village but what will happen to my children? They need to stay 
here in order to complete their school. Where will they live? They will 
continue to live in the shacks just like their father. I am not afraid to 
express my dissatisfaction. The system is unfair our comrades abandoned 
us after independence”.  
 
Some of the ex-combatants were unhappy because the reintegration programme 
was building houses foronly a selected few, targeting the ex-combatants who 
went into exile in 1960 to 1970 and those who became disabled due to the war.  
How am I going to buy a house with my meagre salary? Now I do not own a 
house in town where I work, moreover, my house at my home village is not 
constructed to a proper standard since I do not have money to build it. I 
have to look after my eight children as first priority.” 
 
Respondent X010 said that: 
“I wish if they could have given us all the compensation money paid in 
cash. The fifty thousand dollars that I received I used it to bring piped 
water into my house at village after that there was nothing left. About the 
N$200 000 for the income generating project I still have to receive it”. I 
have been waiting for almost four years now”. 
 
 
 
 
He shrugged his shoulders and said 
“I do not know when they will release my capital project. Even if I go there 
the staff is not helpful. They tell us that they are employed there based on 
the merits of their qualifications. They do not respect us and they do not 
understand what we went through. What can we do it’s true we are not 
educated”. 
4.8.9  The education of ex-combatants 
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According to the Veterans ‘Act, the veterans and their dependents could benefit 
from the veteran scholarship fund per the Veterans’ Act.  However, this was not 
the case as per the Veterans’ Act.  
 
When their children applied for scholarships, they were told to contact the 
Namibian Students’ Fund administration.  When they went there, they were told 
that they did not meet the criteria to receive assistance, despite the fact that 
their children had acceptance letters from institutions of higher learning from 
outside where they wanted to study fields, such as medicine.  
4.8.10Employment opportunities 
 
The ex-combatants noted that there had been many challenging factors in 
employing the former freedom fighters. Some ex-combatants believed that they 
would be employed very easily because they had been in exile. This viewpoint did 
not take into account the reality of the situation in which it was necessary to 
consider the number of returnees, their job experience and skills. The situation 
was not clear to some former freedom fighters that they would have to look for 
employment themselves. Hence, many ex-combatants thought the SWAPO 
leadership would secure employment for them. A former PLAN commander, 
respondent X013, expressed his disappointment and remarked that:  
“How could I be commanded by someone I used to give orders, I just left. 
However, I was lucky that my family had means to assist me to start off as a 
farmer. Some of my comrades were not lucky to have family who could 
support them; consequently, they have been living in abject poverty (PLAN, 
2011).  
Mukwahepo, one of the neglected ex-combatants in Namhila (2013, p. 131), 
states in her book about the story of her journey into exile and being the first 
woman soldier of SWAPO in exile, that: 
“I looked back, reflecting on how, in the refugee camps, SWAPO had 
looked after us so well, yet in an independent Namibia I was facing 
starvation”. 
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All these sentiments were indications that the reintegration of former freedom 
fighters had been challenged by transparency.  
4.9Payouts and capital for income generating projects 
 
Following demonstrations by ex-combatants in 2006, the Namibian government 
offered to pay a package of fifty thousand (N$50,000.00) cash to each registered 
ex-combatant and a further N$200,000.00 was to be paid to individual ex-
combatants as capital for income generating projects, should they come up with a 
feasible and viable business plan. Capital for projects was compulsory and 
failure to come up with a business proposal would see one forfeiting the 
N$200,000.00. All proposals were to be evaluated by the Ministry of Veterans’ 
Affairs in order to assess whether the projects were feasible. 
Some ex-combatants indicated that they had received payouts and capital for 
starting income-generating projects while others were still waiting to be paid for 
their capital projects. They claimed having waited for a period between about 
one and four years. 
However, ex-combatants felt that N$50,000.00 was not enough to cover their 
needs. One of the interviewed ex-combatant asked, “What one can use for 
N$500,000.00 in current economy.” They suggested that if, perhaps, this money 
was given at the beginning of the reintegration process in 1989 it could maybe 
have made a difference.  
The inadequacy was also reflected in the failure of that amount to meet their 
costs. For instance, respondent X010 had to make a loan from a bank (micro 
lender) to add to the N$50,000.00 to finalise connecting his rural home with 
piped water. Another respondent, X07, indicated that the money lasted less than 
a month after its acquisition. The ex-combatant indicated that the money was 
used to finance the purchase of food for the people taking care of his homestead, 
paying their salaries, buying cattle food, paying salaries for those looking after 
his cattle, taking his children for shopping and the rest was spent on petrol. As 
such, this money did not contribute much to the wellbeing of ex-combatants. 
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When they were asked to give their views on the capital for starting income-
generating projects, the ex-combatants appeared not to be impressed with this 
package. One ex-combatant deplored the government’s approach regarding this 
package because the projects were being imposed on them. This ex-combatant 
respondent, X03, who lived in Windhoek with her husband who was also a 
former freedom fighter, stated that: 
“They opened a groceries shop at their village. However, since they did not 
have skills to run a shop the items they were selling were not in demand 
at the village hence, most of these items ended up expiring”.  
Moreover, they were working fulltime about 800 kilometers from where the shop 
was. There was no-one present to control the shop and in the end they had to 
close the shop. As such, ex-combatantX03 questioned the government’s decision 
not to give cash for projects.  
“If we are given cash we may just as well build and renovate our houses”. 
In addition, there were cases where the money was sent to wrong recipients. For 
instance, one ex-combatant indicated that they had submitted their proposal to 
the Ministry for evaluation in 2012. After waiting for a long period and going 
back to the Ministry to enquire about his project, he was told that his project 
money had been sent to an unknown company, apparently a company different 
from the one from which he had obtained quotations to provide for the materials 
for his income generating project. He claimed that there were many of them who 
had the money for their capital projects paid into the accounts of this unknown, 
dubious company in 2012, and that the Ministry had failed to correct this 
mistake and release their capital funds. This left the ex-combatants suspecting 
foul play or corruption. 
Ex-combatants were asked how they found the compensation package. All the ex-
combatants were in agreement that compensation would never be enough and it 
was impossible to satisfy everybody. However, they felt that the cash lump sum 
was too small, should one take the current, economic situation in the world, 
Namibia included, into consideration. Some ex-combatants interjected that they 
did not regard themselves as having been compensated or reintegrated, and one 
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pointed to his dwelling which was built out of iron sheets and a cupboard. He 
again pointed to his surrounding area and said, 
“After my shack I have no piece of land left for me to make a garden or my 
children play in. If my neighbour’s shack caught fire there is high 
probability the fire would spread to mine too”.  
However, one ex-combatant felt that it was impossible to compensate former 
freedom fighters because their contribution was too enormous to be converted 
into monetary terms. The government should just continue supporting war 
veterans by addressing their needs for the rest of their lives. 
4.10 The process of reintegration 
 
This section presents ex-combatant’s experiences regarding the available 
supporting structures and programmes of reintegration. It goes on to outline 
their expectations and the challenges they faced.  
 
None of the participants knew who was responsible for the reintegration. 
However, they felt that SWAPO was the one to take the responsibility of 
handling ex-combatants’ affairs in the same way that they did during the war. It 
was felt that now SWAPO was in a good position to take care of its former 
freedom fighters as they had access to the country’s resources, unlike when they 
depended on donations while in exile.  
 
After further probes, one key informant, who was also an ex-combatant, 
informed the researcher that during the implementation of Resolution 435 it was 
thought that the churches could help in the process of reintegration. Churches 
helped to find the families of some returnees. Some of the returnees went 
straight to their homes, especially those who had joined not long ago. However, 
some of the returnees who had been in the war for ten to twenty years found it 
difficult to establish the whereabouts of their families. These people were 
accommodated in centres that were established by the churches, in conjunction 
with the United Nations. The churches and United Nations officials 
administered these centres. Some of the returnees stayed there for only one or 
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two days, while others stayed longer. The United Nations faced some difficulties 
as some of the returnees did not want to reintegrate with their families. Others 
had difficulties tracing their families, as mentioned above. The UN faced a 
dilemma, since it wanted the resolution to be implemented without delay. 
Before leaving the repatriation centre every repatriated ex-combatant was given 
R10.00, one mattress, one blanket, one axe, a panga, two tins of fish and a 10 kg 
bag of maize meal to take home. While at home, they were to receive food rations 
for six months, and thereafter they had to survive on their own. The 
reintegration process did not work out well for all the ex-combatants because not 
all of them managed to secure employment in order to sustain themselves. 
Consequently, they started to stage demonstrations that forced the government 
to come up with several interventions. The last intervention was to give the ex-
combatants money in cash and money for projects. 
4.11 Integrating into the society 
 
Reintegration was not something that happened overnight. It took time, since 
the Namibian people had been at war. Consequently, some people did not trust 
one another. Sometimes, sister fought against sister, and brother against 
brother. People called each other names, like puppets, collaborators, terrorists, 
and so on. Therefore, this situation needed patience and goodwill from both sides 
to unite ‘terrorists’ and ‘collaborators’ of the South African government. 
In addition, disarming and reintegrating left ex-combatants insecure after being 
used to the life of carrying a gun. One ex-combatantX018 stated that: 
“We were simply afraid to resume civilian life without my gun and 
ammunition there was very little to pack. What we had was hope because 
we had a lot of conversation among ourselves and we talked about 
economic development that would follow the victory of SWAPO”.  
 
He said “we had hope and hope kept us to soldier on despite many challenges 
before and after independence”. 
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4.12 Reintegration, culture and the reconciliation policy 
 
Reintegration meant many different things to individual, former freedom 
fighters. Some thought about their roots and where they had come from before 
they joined the liberation struggle. This attitude shaped the smooth process of 
reintegration, despite the challenges that came with the process of returning to 
civilian life after many years in the combat uniform. Respondent X018 stated 
that “it is the culture that tells you who you are, the way to behave and how to 
do things”.  
 
The ex-combatants believed that they were in the footsteps of their forebears and 
it was because of their bravery that the war was won. Almost every ex-
combatant believed that it was this spirit that kept them going, despite all the 
challenges that confronted them during the war. It can thus be concluded that 
cultural influences played a big role in the disciplining of former PLAN fighters. 
In addition, the National reconciliation policy was claimed to have eased the 
social integration among ex-combatants. An ex-combatant, X018, stated that: 
“National reconciliation policy helped us as Namibians to put our 
differences aside. It was this policy that made it possible to keep 
everything on track and the reintegration went without as well as had 
been planned”. 
4.13 Poor record of ex-combatants in exile 
 
The study found that there was poor recording of ex-combatants in exile or the 
liberation movement did not want to avail or release their records while in exile. 
This can be confirmed by the fact that the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs is now 
engaged in a process to verify or establish what had happened to the deceased 
and missing combatants by asking their families what had happened to their 
missing relatives. The question remains: how will they know whether these 
people were in the care of the liberation movement? The liberation movement 
must answer these questions. Some members of the Namibia community 
activists expressed such sentiments. A former freedom fighter wrote in the local 
newspaper, asking how the family would know what had happened to their 
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relatives, if all that they knew was that their relatives had left to join the 
liberation movement in exile, never to return. The stories of some destitute ex-
combatants who were found in Angola had been reported in the local media.  
When asked how the records of most of the ex-combatants while in exile were 
kept, the respondents stated that SWAPO had a good method and strictly 
recorded every combatant’s movement. They said everyone’s movement from 
each point was recorded and some said they were involved in these activities. 
This sentiment was different from Mwange’s sentiment (Dzinesa, 2006) where it 
was claimed that SWAPO conducted poor record keeping while in exile. This 
contradictory view can be an issue of context. It all depends where these ex-
combatants were stationed while in exile. 
Respondent X02 stated that the documents containing the records of the ex-
combatants were transported back from Angola to Namibia but were never 
accessed. It seemed people were no longer interested in them. They seemed to be 
more interested in the materials that were donated by the international donor 
communities that were supporting SWAPO (Namibian Sun, 2015; New Era, 
2015). 
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the research results in relation to the 
literature review presented in Chapter 2.  
The findings suggest that the demobilisation and disarmament in Namibia 
was successfully accomplished, as previous studies have indicated. However, 
just like in any other country where the DDR was carried out, Namibia’s 
reintegration seems to have suffered the same setbacks and has remained a 
challenge that is far from over. The study findings indicate that the Namibian 
government had no intention or plan in place for a programme to address the 
reintegration process soon after Independence.  
5.2 A perspective about the general state of inequality and poverty in 
Namibia 
 
Namibia has one of highest degrees of income inequality in the world. Twenty-six 
years after Independence the country is still highly fragmented and it seems this 
status quo is far from over.  
The root cause of inequality in Namibia is the economic system that has been 
adopted after Independence, based on market-driven, economic policies. It is a 
state of affairs which is deeply rooted and can be traced back to the colonial era 
where the economic policies were the cause of imbalances. The Namibia 
government is challenged to make significant changes in order to address these 
imbalances (Jauch, Edwards, & Cupido, 2009). 
Namibia has a high per capita GDP and this status hides one of the world's most 
unequal income distributions, as shown by Namibia's Gini coefficient of 0.5972. 
However, Namibia’s Gini coefficient has improved significantly over the years, 
that is, from 0.70 (out of 1) in 1993/1994 to 0.63 in 2003/2004, and further to 
0.597 in the 2009/2010 National Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
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This implies that the distribution of income is becoming fairer over the years 
even though is not steady (Schmidt, 2009; Jauch, 2009;Hamilton, 2015;Human 
Development Reports, 2015). 
According to Jauch (2009), Namibia’s Gini Coefficient stood at 0.70 in 1990. This 
indicates that it has since been decreased with 10%. However, it can be argued 
that the living standards of only a few individuals have improved, creating a 
small group of black elite. The majority of people remain in poverty. The Gini 
coefficient is a measure used to measure inequality. It ranges from 0% which 
represents prefect equality and 1% which represents prefect inequality. Prefect 
inequality is where one person has all the income in society and everyone else 
has nothing. The UNDP defines the Gini coefficient as “Income Gini coefficient. This 
is a measure of deviation in the distribution of income among individuals or households 
within a country from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality 
and a value of 100 represents absolute inequality (Hamilton, 2015; Human Development 
Reports, 2015; Institute of Public Policy Research, 2009; Schmidt, 2009; World Bank, 
2013; World Development Indicators 2013). 
NHIES in Schmidt (2009) reported that about 36% household in Namibia had no 
access to electricity, while 43% of households did not have access to water, 34% 
households did not have access to sanitation, while school enrolment stood at 
81%; however, there had been a drop in enrolment of 5.7% in rural areas. The 
National Planning Commission (2015) revealed that there was a negative 
correlation between poverty and educational attainment. The people who were 
better educated had a high income and thus were less likely to be poor. The 
study also found that in poverty stricken areas there was a high premature 
mortality, including high levels of infant mortality, a reflection of a high level of 
ill-health. The National Planning Commission report findings were the same as 
those by Jauch (2009) which pointed to gender, race and regional, ethnic, 
educational and class dimensions of inequality. Namibia has t the highest GDP 
per capita compared to neighbouring countries, like Botswana; however, at the 
same time it is the country that has the highest levels of inequality. 
Jauch, Edwards and Cupido, (2009)argue that the economic progress of Namibia is 
contradicting; the country is classified as a medium income, developing country 
with a per capita of income estimated as US$2000; however, it scores low on 
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other indices of development. Namibia ranks 127 out of 177 countries on the 
2006 Human Development Index (World Bank, 2007). Although, Namibia’s 
economy has been reported at global level as a growing economy, at home it has 
failed to reduce poverty and the unemployment rate stands at 29%. Therefore, 
the research concludes that Namibia’s economy has been positively growing in 
the past years, but this growth has failed to narrow the income gap, and the poor 
are becoming poorer and the rich richer. 
This status quo can be also a contributing factor to fact that the war veterans 
have remained displeased with their living conditions. The UNDP report (2015) 
warns that the more inequality there is in a country, the greater the loss in 
human development there will be. 
 
5.3 Reintegration process 
 
The assistance that was given to former freedom fighters was mainly given to 
a few retirees of SWAPO; however, it did not make much impact on their lives, 
since it was not done on the basis of their basic needs but it seemed to be only 
a kind of token of appreciation to the elderly who were in exile. It was also not 
done on a long term basis.  
This view is deduced from the story of Mukwahepo where she explained how 
they were given cattle which were kept for them by SWAPO in the Okavango 
Region, one of the 14 political regions in Namibia. She continued that when 
she went to receive her cattle, she met with other SWAPO elders who also 
came to fetch their cattle. The researcher tried to find out from where these 
donated cattle were coming, and was informed by some respondents that the 
cattle belonged to SWAPO and most of them were captured from UNITA by 
SWAPO during the war in Angola. 
5.4 The lack of plans and delays in the implementation of the 
reintegration programme 
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The study established that all the reintegration programmes that were 
implemented by the government were implemented as a response to protests 
by former freedom fighters against their poor living conditions; however, as 
soon as the ex-combatants’ protests ended, the government became relaxed 
again and did little to address the reintegration programme effectively. This 
scenario went on until 2006 when protests spread widely across the country 
and the government was warned that the country was under security threat. 
This time even the former freedom fighters, who were employed in security 
sectors and other establishments, were sharing the same sentiment as those 
unemployed or retired ex-freedom fighters, namely that they deserved to be 
rewarded for their contribution to the liberation struggle. It was clear that all 
the former freedom fighters were secretly supporting the protestors who 
demanded to be assisted by reintegration programmes.  
During this period a local human rights activist warned the government to 
take note of the security treat these protests were posing to the government. 
This activist gave an example that in the corridors of security establishments 
security personnel, who were standing in groups of two or three, were 
discussing the compensation for having liberated the country that was owed to 
them by the government (Phil ya Nangoloh, 2006) 
Another factor that indicates that the government was not ready to provide 
assistance to former freedom fighters was the sentiments that were expressed 
by some of the politicians, namely that former freedom fighters were 
volunteers and were not forced to join SWAPO, neither were they invited to 
join; consequently, the government owed them nothing. Additional to this was 
the reluctance of the cabinet to approve compensation packages for the ex-
combatants.  
5.5 The government’s commitment to the reintegration process 
 
The study took note that the government was doing everything to help the 
veterans to reintegrate but some of the benefits, especially the capital projects, 
were not community driven, and, therefore, might not be sustainable. The 
study found that many of the war veterans had submitted business plans for 
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the sake of not forfeiting these benefits, since they could not access them 
without business plans. The research found that many ex-combatants bought 
cars and equipment in order to start a business, irrespective of their age, lack 
of skills to engage in such business and other circumstances, such as being 
employed fulltime which made it impossible for them to run a business. It was 
also established that many cars that were bought were in disrepair and the 
owners did not have funds for repairs. The respondents also complained about 
old veterans being forced to engage in projects, despite their old age, as some 
are already in their nineties.  
 
5.6 Lack of records and poor recordkeeping of former freedom fighters 
during the liberation struggle 
 
The study found that there was either a poor recording system or 
unwillingness from the liberation movement to make use of the records of the 
former freedom fighters once they were back in the country. This situation 
made it difficult for a reintegration programme, as the government had to rely 
on the more recently collected data that had been collected during the 
registration of former ex-combatants since 2006. 
The study also found that politicians had been using rhetoric and the icons of 
the liberation struggle when it benefitted them to advance their own political 
agendas, but failed to take care of the former fighters. This was the case with 
one of the former, second commanders of SWAPO at Omughuuluwombase who 
was imprisoned at Robben Island. In her autobiography, Mukwahepo, the first 
woman to join SWAPO and the first woman soldier of SWAPO, told a similar 
story. The family of the former commander claimed that the government had 
failed to take care of him. They claimed that he died a broken man. The 
government, however, had never failed to invite him to attend national events 
where rhetorical speeches were made. They actually just went there to be 
paraded and then came back to their home village where they continued to live 
in abject poverty.  
86 
 
This was the same situation with Mukwahepo. She was invited to share the 
podium with politicians at political rallies; however, afterwards she would go 
back to her village to live in a container and later-on in a house that was built 
for her in the village in a flood-prone area. Meanwhile, the politicians went 
back to Windhoek and forgot about these liberation icons, just to remember 
them again when these events came around again. She narrated how she was 
disappointed that her own comrades had forgotten about her, although they 
had said that they would give her a silver medal, ‘but on an empty stomach’. 
The lack of records of SWAPO freedom fighters also contributed to some of the 
ex-combatants’ failure to be called for employment opportunities. As a result, 
comrades instead started to recruit their own families. 
5.7 Low income and lack of savings 
 
The research study also found that many former freedom fighters were 
reluctant to go on retirement because of their low income and a lack of 
savings; therefore, they would rather try to extend their retirement age to 
work longer. The disadvantage of this practice is that the public service will be 
inundated with an aging work force that sometimes does not have applicable 
skills besides their liberation credentials.  
The second disadvantage of an aging work force is that there would be no 
posts available in the public service and this will block the youth from 
entering the government work pool, a situation that will contribute to 
unemployment and a high wage bill that has to pay an unproductive work 
force. The third disadvantage is that the government will be deprived of 
young, skilled graduates who could enter the labour market. 
 
5.8 Lack of land and poor housing 
 
The study found that the former freedom fighters lacked land. The study also 
established that the lack of land had pitted the ex-combatants against each 
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other and against community members. The ex-combatants felt that they were 
not accepted and welcomed in their communities, while the community 
members felt that the former freedom fighters exhibited a sense of entitlement 
for having liberated the country. 
Veterans were also facing challenges regarding housing in urban areas due to 
the high price of land and housing in urban areas. In the rural areas, they 
might have a piece of land but lacked financial means to develop the land and 
put up proper housing structures; therefore, they lacked proper housing in 
urban and rural areas. The majority of them would retire to their home 
villages where they would live in poor housing structures with no basic 
facilities, such as running water and sanitation. 
 
5.9 Alcohol abuse and suicide among former freedom fighters 
 
The study found that after years of waiting, hoping to be assisted with 
integration into civilian life and these hopes being dashed, they turned to 
abusing alcohol and some ended up committing suicide due to frustration. 
Namibia has been experiencing a high rate of suicide in recent years. 
5.10 Ex-combatants shun psychological counselling 
 
The Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs put in place counselling services. However, 
when asked about this service, some of the respondents expressed a lack of 
confidence regarding some of the service suppliers. This was also confirmed by 
the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs. New Era (2015) claims that the war veterans 
did not want to be counselled by young social workers. Respondent X018 
referred to a local pastor as a counsellor involved with war veterans. He 
disapproved this involvement, questioning the capacity of this counsellor. 
Conversely, I found it very ironical that the veterans were more relaxed and 
could share with the researcher some sensitive information. It appeared that 
the study was actually a kind of counselling in the form of sharing sensitive 
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information regarding events that occurred during the war, something that 
the former freedom fighters would not feel comfortable to share easily, taking 
into consideration the sensitivity of the information.  
The shunning of psychological counselling by ex-combatants can be because 
they would first try to filter the background of the person with whom they 
were sharing their sensitive experience; they needed to trust that the 
particular counsellor would not divulge their sensitive experiences to others. 
For example, one respondent shared with the researcher how some of his 
colleagues had mysteriously disappeared and another respondent shared the 
story of some 12 rules that were introduced in the movement as a measure of 
discipline but at the end of the day many innocent lives were lost.  According 
to the respondents, the 12 rules were controversial. One of the rules was that 
no fighter should lose any of his military items; this led to many fighters being 
killed by fellow comrades. It could be a cap, gun or water container or arriving 
late at assembly after dispersing in different directions, when they had to 
retreat after skirmishes with an enemy. For these offences they would be 
sentenced to die by firing squad. Another, painful rule was that, if they were 
told to be at a meeting point at an exact time, they should be there. Failing to 
arrive on time (no matter what circumstance occurred while they were 
retreating from the enemy) would an offense and there would be no 
consideration of mercy; they would be killed by firing squad. One of the 
respondents,X01, narrated how one of the victims of these rules was executed 
by firing squad.  
The worst for the fighters was the fact that those who had to carry out the 
shooting were randomly selected. Refusing to carry out the order meant they 
too would have the same fate. He vividly told the story and ended by saying 
that: 
“Until today that picture, that memory, of my comrade dying getting 
killed by firing squad refuses to leave my mind”.  
This respondent was traumatised by the incident and needed counselling. On 
this basis, indeed, the ex-combatants were in need of counselling. However, 
this subject is very sensitive, as it can undo the national policy of 
89 
 
reconciliation. It is the view of the researcher that an amnesty, perhaps, needs 
to be in place to bring a solution, if counselling of ex-combatants should be a 
success. 
5.11 Children of the Liberation Struggle (CLS) 
 
The former freedom fighters were divided on the CLS issue. While some felt 
that the demands of the CLS were genuine, some thought that the CLS were 
just Namibian children, the same as all other Namibian children. The study 
found that the ones, who supported the CLS issue, were the ones who had 
been actively involved in the front line and had witnessed the death of some of 
their comrades who, they said, were the fathers and mothers of the CLS. They 
deplored the way the issue of orphans and vulnerable children in exile was 
handled. They claimed that some of these children were just dumped on their 
relatives whom they did not know and who did not have the means to take 
care of their needs.  
Respondent X011 said: 
“Just imagine a child who grew up in East German for all her 
childhood just to be dump in a rural village deep down in the bush in 
northern Namibia. Obviously this child will suffer from culture shock 
and that is what has happened”. 
The CLS continued to camp out, demanding to be given jobs and to be given 
veteran status. Respondent X09 stated that the CLS could qualify to be war 
veterans because they were their children born in exile and if the war did not 
come to an end, they too would have ended up becoming fighters, like their 
parents. 
5.12 The reintegration programme viewed as a compensation 
programme 
 
The study established that the Namibia government did not take into full 
account all of the UN IDDRS operational guidelines, such as the demands to 
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consider that the members of former SWATF and KOEVOET were also 
veteran combatants and, as a result, should be beneficiaries of the 
reintegration programme as well. The UN approach to DDR clearly specifies 
that beneficiaries of the DDR should include armed forces from conflicting 
groups, abductees, dependants, civilian returnees and communities. Focus 
seems to be on selected ex-combatants and abductees.   
Furthermore, Namibia’s DDR programme appears to lack grassroots support 
from affected stakeholders due to conflict regarding expected compensation, 
something that does not align with the UN approach to DDR. For instance, 
some former freedom fighters felt that the term ‘compensation’ was not the 
right term to be used and preferred the term ‘reintegration programme’. Those 
who felt strongly that they should be compensated were those who had spent 
their entire lives on the frontlines, contrary to those who had had the 
opportunity to study while in exile. These conflicting views suggest that the 
DDR process was not clearly defined right from the start, as recommended by 
the UN’s approach to DDR. 
The term ‘compensation’ is very tricky in this situation, because the study 
found that, on one hand, it can be the proper term because, as per the Namibia 
Veterans’ Act of 2008, the reintegration programme was strictly designed to 
assist mainly those ex-combatants, prisoners of war on Robben Island who 
fought to liberate the country, and supporters of the SWAPO movement who 
provided immense support by providing information orbeing engaged in 
activities that promoted the liberation struggle agenda. The Act strictly 
forbids compensation for those ex-combatants who had fought alongside the 
South African forces of the apartheid regime or anyone who was perceived to 
be against Namibia’s freedom. 
However, it’s the opinion of the research that the war veterans is a broad term 
that cannot be defined and confined to one group, in this case the former 
freedom fighter. In other post-war countries the war veterans’ term is used in 
reference to all ex-soldiers irrespective whether they were fighting on the right 
or wrong side. In other countries reintegration benefited both groups of war 
veterans.  Furthermore, several studies states that implementation of DDR 
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programme are done according in the context of the conflict. Therefore, the 
discrimination of SWATF and Koevoet ex- soldiers by the War Veterans Act is 
a context issue. However, in the spirit of National Reconciliation Policy this 
Act can be revisited. 
5.13 Greed combined by the sense of entitlement 
 
The study also found that the well-off veterans, regarded to be amongst the 
privileged today, had also benefitted from this programme by claiming to be 
amongst the historically disadvantaged. While these people were silent 
regarding the demands of the former freedom fighters at the beginning, they 
became the largest number of beneficiaries of the programme. Jauch (2013) 
deplores this act by saying that:  
“The initial idea was to secure the livelihood of those war veterans 
who continued to experience hardships. However, the definition of 
war veterans and the modalities of identifying and rewarding them 
were controversial and allowed certain people to claim while 
excluding others, for example, some of those children raised in exile 
not born there. It is a well-known fact that highly paid public officials 
are amongst those who claimed the war veterans’ pay-outs. This 
includes the majority of Cabinet members as well as highly paid 
managers at parastatals and municipalities. They are certainly not 
amongst the needy Namibians who should have been the 
beneficiaries. While the well-off veterans may claim to be amongst 
the ‘historically disadvantaged’, they must certainly be regarded to 
be amongst the privileged today. It is a sad indictment of the 
greediness amongst Namibia’s elite that they are now hiding behind 
the argument of legality to justifying their pay-outs. In general, we 
seem to have almost completely forgotten the meaning of social 
justice and solidarity in building a new society. An elite that usurps 
public resources for personal benefit leaves very little for those who 
are in need. The question of war veterans and their plight should not 
be seen in isolation but must be placed in the context of widespread 
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poverty and exclusion in Namibia today. Redistribution in favour of 
the poor should be the focus”. 
In summary, the pay-outs benefitted all the former freedom fighters, 
irrespective their socio-economic status. The discrepancy is that the well-paid 
and elite former combatants were the first to receive their pay-outs and it is 
alleged that some of them managed to obtain assistance for their capital 
projects in cash form. If this is a fact, there is a need for transparency in the 
distribution of compensation for ex-combatants. 
5.14 A reintegration programme not inclusive of all ex combatants 
 
The fact that only those who were on the side of the liberation struggle 
benefitted from this fund tends to give the impression that it was more a 
compensation than reintegration assistance programme as is commonly done 
for the ex-combatants of a post-war country. Moreover, the UN IDDRS 
guidelines compel that all the ex-combatants, irrespective the side on which 
they had been fighting, should qualify in terms of DDR. 
Another important point to note is that the reintegration process must benefit 
the community where it is taking place, in order to avoid jealousy among the 
community members. The impact of the Namibian reintegration approach is 
yet to be noticed within the communities where the ex-combatants live. The 
challenge now is that the reintegration has been taking place for 26 years 
since Independence. The study observed that poverty affected almost 
everyone, irrespective their status. Hence, assisting just a group of ex-
combatants or veterans as per the Namibia Veterans’ Act is likely to become 
problematic for the government in the future, if the basic needs of all the 
community members are not addressed. The process is also likely to cause 
jealousy among the community members. However, the current approach and 
the policy of inclusivity by the Head of State, accompanied by the slogan that 
no-one should “feel left out”, can address this situation. 
The study found that the current reintegration process was not a complete 
reintegration programme for ex-combatants because both sides of former 
93 
 
combatants did not benefit from this process. Furthermore, the study found 
the Veterans’ Act of 2008 to be discriminative and operating contrary to the 
National Reconciliation Policy that was declared at Namibia’s independence. 
According to the Namibian Veterans’ Act of 2008, a veteran is defined as a 
person who had been a member of the liberation struggle forces and who 
consistently and persistently participated in the political, diplomatic or 
underground activities in support of liberation struggle activities. This leaves 
out other ex-combatants. This Act does not consider the international 
guidelines of DDR standards, despite the fact that Namibia is a member of the 
UN council and has been participating in the international peacekeeping 
operations across the world. 
The findings also suggest that the Namibian government has ignored the DDR 
international standards that were developed by the UN, and has opted to use 
the traditional approach. Another determining factor for Namibia’s 
reintegration programme is the context factor that the war, that took place in 
Namibia, was a war that was fought to remove the colonial forces. This is 
unlike situations where an internal war was raging – something that is 
currently more common in cases where DDR has been applied. As a result, due 
to this context factor, the reintegration programme was designed and 
implemented to help only one group of ex-combatants, namely those of PLAN 
of SWAPO, who used to be freedom fighters. However, this approach is biased 
and unfair, when one considers the policy of National Reconciliation that was 
adopted and declared by the Founding President at Namibia’s independence.  
Moreover, some well-known former South Africa collaborators and soldiers 
have since joined the ruling SWAPO party and have become Members of 
Parliament and ministers. Consequently, to discriminate against the ordinary, 
former SWATF and KOEVOET soldiers is unfair. Furthermore, this selective 
reintegration approach suggests that the compensation approach is politically 
motivated rather than being a nation building and peace-building process. 
One cannot but wonder why ex-combatants, fighting on the side of the enemy 
of Namibia who used to be foot soldiers and are currently unemployed, would 
receive only reintegration assistance, but a former collaborator, who has since 
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joined the ruling SWAPO party, can now become a parliamentarian or a 
cabinet minister on a SWAPO party ticket. This leaves one to ponder why an 
ordinary, former combatant cannot be forgiven, while a former ex-soldier of 
the South Africa Defence or a diehard supporter of the South African 
apartheid regime, who has turned politician, has been forgiven and welcomed 
into the ranks of the elite of the ruling party, a former liberation movement. 
This sentiment was quoted by the local media in a random survey to elucidate 
the general view of the population regarding the issue of ex-combatants who 
had fought on the enemy side. Respondent X01 in this survey was quoted in 
the Namibia Sun, 2016, in response to the issue of ex SWATF/KOEVOET that 
“They are not asking for government’s money, they are asking for their 
own money – money that is due to them. What I heard is that former 
South African soldiers were given money which was handed over to the 
incoming (SWAPO) government (then) by the former administration. So 
if that money was not given to them, they should just get paid like the 
current veterans. We are all Namibians, so when they get compensated 
they will not go and spend the money in South Africa. They will but form 
local businesses and we will all benefit. After all, some puppets in the 
former South African administration – including chiefs and those that 
served in the cabinet – are living well and have received veteran status 
from the Namibian government, when we know for sure that they were 
puppets. So, Jabulani has a case. He has seen his masters getting 
recognition”. 
Jabulani is the leader of the former SWATF and KOEVOET demanding to 
be included in the reintegration programme. 
Another respondent, X02, stated the following: 
“Of course they fought; they should get the money for the sake of 
harmony and democracy. They can get less than what other 
recognized veterans are getting but they should get something”. 
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However, there were also those who shared the same sentiment of the 
politicians of the ruling party concerning the former liberation movement. 
Quoted as follows: 
Respondent X03: 
“Shoprite employees cannot demand remuneration from Pick n Pay. 
Those people should go and claim their money and recognition from the 
South African government. It is not a problem if they are getting paid 
or getting recognized but they should demand compensation from their 
masters. The Namibian government should only consider its own 
veterans not former KOEVOETs”. 
Respondent 04: 
“Those guys were employed by the South African government and they 
were fighting against SWAPO. The Namibian government is a SWAPO-
led government. Why should the SWAPO-led government compensate 
them? They should go and get paid by whoever they were working for”. 
 
Respondent 05: 
“Who should give them money? Whose government should pay them? 
They were fighting against SWAPO. Why should they get paid? If they 
are asking compensation from the South African government then I’ll 
have no objection”. 
Respondent 04: 
“The former South African soldiers are asking recognition from the 
wrong people. Why can’t they simply ask their former bosses to 
recognize them and compensate them?” 
The study takes note that this approach did not only discriminate against the 
ex-combatants who had fought on the side of the enemy but also 
disadvantaged their dependents as their parents were unable to support them. 
The policy of reconciliation is introduced for peace-building and to ensure 
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peace and stability; however, if one section of the participants in the war feels 
that they were treated unfairly, it can become a threat to peace and stability. 
This is currently the situation as the former SWATF and KOEVOET members 
are protesting and camping out in the Namibian capital, Windhoek, 
demanding to be given veteran status. 
The SWAFT and KOEVOET members seemed to understand their position 
when their spokesperson stated that Namibians should understand that they 
had never claimed to be veterans of the liberation struggle because they could 
never be. SWAPO was fighting for the liberation struggle; they were not. They 
just wanted to be recognised as war veterans (New Era, 2016). Again the 
leader of the former SWATF/KOEVOET was quoted in the media, saying that: 
“Our demands are 100 percent genuine. In 1990 when Namibia got 
independence, people (SWATF/KOEVOET) were scared of SWAPO. 
Some of us were supposed to go and work for the South African Defence 
Force but the Founding Father President Sam Nujoma said Namibia is 
for all of us, we are brothers and sisters. The following year we were 
called to go and work for the Namibia Defence Force. Of course our 
demands are genuine. A veteran is not only someone that fought in a 
liberation struggle, a veteran is a former soldier. I know the Namibian 
Veteran Act has excluded us. I call it a draconic law. Members of 
parliament are supposed to make laws for all citizens but it is not the 
same case as with our MPs”. 
The issue of SWATF/KOEVOET ex-combatants is a subject that needs to be 
studied on its own. This study was limited to veterans who had been given 
recognition by the Namibia Veterans’ Act, 2008. Hence, I leave it to other 
researchers with an interest in DDR to study it further. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
As it has been stated earlier in Chapter One, the purpose of the study was to 
explore the expectations, views and opinions of the war veterans regarding the 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process in terms of 
compensation, with the aim to provide a better understanding of former 
combatants’ needs and views regarding their expectations in relation to their 
reintegration into society. This study employed the term ‘compensation’ which is 
a term used by the ex-combatants when demanding recognition within the 
reintegration programme for the contributions they had made to the liberation 
struggle as PLAN soldiers. 
The study sought to understand how the former combatants had been briefed by 
their commanders during the demobilisation process. It is generally assumed 
that when the war veterans were inspired to join the liberation struggle, they 
had expectations to come back home as heroes and heroines and would enjoy a 
share of the country’s resources in the event that they had won the war. The 
study attempted to find answers regarding the hopes, expectations and dreams 
of the war veterans about a liberated Namibia.  
In addition, the researcher believes that the on-going processes of DDR in other 
countries acted as an eye-opener to the ex-combatants in such a way that they 
felt that they had to be compensated or the government should at least attend to 
their needs regarding compensation for their war efforts. Consequently, the 
study sought to evaluate their expectations against reality and how to bridge the 
gap between the two. 
The research addressed the following sub-objectives: to examine the DDR 
practices as they were implemented in Namibia; to establish the main players or 
initiators of Namibia’s DDR processes; to establish the expectations of ex-
combatants in relation to the DDR processes; to establish the challenges faced by 
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the war veterans of the Namibian liberation struggle; to determine the 
challenges faced by the Namibian government in the reintegration of ex-
combatants, as well as to assist the Namibian government to address the plight 
of the ex-combatants. 
In order to meet the objectives highlighted above, the research needed to answer 
the following research questions to gain the perspectives of war veterans. The 
key questions were concerned with the ex-combatants’ expectations regarding 
the DDR processes; the current challenges faced by ex-combatants; the extent to 
which the DDR programme was implemented in Namibia. The sub-questions 
were concerned with the main players or initiators in Namibia’s DDR process 
and the challenges faced by the Namibian government in assisting war veterans. 
This was important, because often studies fail to consider the views of the former 
fighters and tend to focus on how the reintegration process was conducted. For 
example, work had been done mainly with the aim to establish how many ex-
combatants were given skills training but failed to investigate how they felt 
about what was being done for them. 
The study to a large extent addressed the research questions. This process 
started with a review of relevant literature which revealed that DDR had 
become an important tool for peace stabilisation in post-war countries. It also 
revealed that DDR was an old tool used after all wars, but that recently it had 
been improved to adapt to the current situation. It also revealed that DDR was 
not a template that could be applied to any DDR situation but that context 
factors played an important role in determining how a DDR process could be 
implemented in different countries. In Southern Africa countries, DDR was 
characterised by the context factors of the war to end apartheid, while, in 
Angola, its DDR was determined by the context factor that one warring party 
had won the war, resulting in the defeat of the other. 
One of the main findings of this study confirms that the challenges regarding 
the reintegration of war veteran are far from over. The fact that war veterans 
are still not happy with the current process is an indication that they will 
continue demanding more from the government. If these demands are not 
properly handled, they will impact negatively on the country’s economy. A 
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good example of this is the case of Zimbabwe. It is well-documented in 
literature that one of the factors that contributed to the collapse of the 
economy of Zimbabwe was the large amount of cash pay-out to the former 
liberation war veterans (Kairiza, 2012). 
Furthermore, another finding of this study is that the Veterans’ Act of 2008 is 
discriminative and operating contrary to the National Reconciliation Policy 
that was declared at Namibia’s independence. According to the Namibian 
Veterans’ Act of 2008, a veteran is defined as a person who had been a 
member of the liberation struggle forces and who consistently and persistently 
participated in the political, diplomatic or underground activities in support of 
the liberation struggle. This excludes other ex-combatants. This Act does not 
consider the international guidelines of DDR standards, despite the fact that 
Namibia is a member of the UN council and has been participating in 
international peacekeeping operations across the world. 
Based on the findings of the study, it can be concluded that the challenge of 
the Namibian government was that it had had no plans to implement a 
reintegration programme and was wishing that this challenge would go away 
on its own. However, when the government was faced with this challenge, it 
responded positively and started to address the plight of the freedom fighters 
by creating the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs. The study concludes that the 
context factors determined the unfolding of events. Since this was a national 
war to liberate the country from apartheid laws, the freedom fighters had no 
interest in conducting violent uprisings, but instead opted to engage their 
government and negotiate peaceful. It is imperative to note that the basic 
needs of former freedom fighters, especially those with low income, need to be 
taken seriously and that the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs needs to improve its 
service delivery and customer service. 
The study included the actors and beneficiaries of the DDR programme, 
namely, former freedom fighters, the government, the United Nations, civil 
societies, children of the liberation struggle, former KOEVOET/SWATF, 
communities where the war was taking place, counsellors and pastors of whom 
some were playing an active role while others had been dominant. 
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6.2 Recommendations 
 
The study recommends the following interventions: 
 The government is to continue with the lump sum pay-outs to freedom 
fighters as part of their reintegration programme. Although no monetary 
value will equal their sacrifices, this is a small way of showing gratitude 
for what they had done for Namibia.  
 The government needs to broaden the reintegration programme to be 
inclusive and to be extended to all ex-combatants. 
 The study recommends that the decision and/or law makers should be 
advised, and become aware, of the current UN operational guidelines of 
DDR standards. This will help them to realise that DDR is a stabilising 
process and, therefore, it needs to be inclusive, if peace and stability are 
to be maintained. They also need to acquaint themselves with the new 
DDR approaches which will contribute to the peacebuilding that has been 
adopted after Independence. 
 The registration process and approval of veterans’ benefits need an 
overhaul to ensure transparency and efficiency. 
 Capital project benefits need to be re-evaluated, as the current status 
does not address the basic needs of the war veterans. 
 The government needs to consider housing for low-income veterans, 
irrespective of their age. 
 The government needs to regulate housing and rental prices, as well as 
land in urban and rural areas, as a matter of urgency. 
 A process to start looking into the plight of the relatives of freedom 
fighters, who had sacrificed their lives in the liberation struggle, should 
be implemented, as the findings of this study clearly indicate that some of 
the demonstrating struggle kids were indeed children of those fallen 
fighters. 
 The government needs to consider an exit strategy for the employed 
veterans, who are holding lower paid positions, to be promoted to a 
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certain level before they are to go on retirement. This will help to boost 
their retirement funds and will encourage them to retire because it 
appears that they are afraid to go on retirement where they will receive 
only a small pension.  
In conclusion, the study takes note of the point of view of some sectors of the 
society that it is a fact that some ex-combatants fought alongside the enemy; 
however, the fact that the country has adopted the National Reconciliation 
Policy means that the past has been buried and wrong-doing has been 
forgiven. Moreover, Namibia being a member of the mother body, the United 
Nations, ought to follow the IDDRS as guideline for DDR implementation. 
Therefore, the reintegration process should be inclusive. This approach is not 
only affecting the former SWATF and KOEVOET soldiers, but their 
dependents are also affected and trapped in vicious poverty. 
The issue of the reintegration of ex-combatants, in general, has not been 
addressed as yet, since the current approach is only targeting the former 
freedom fighters and excluding their children and those who were fighting on 
the wrong side,as it is known. 
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APPENDIX A 
Research Questions 
  
1. Age category 
 
2. How old were you when you joined the liberation struggle? 
3. How were you recruited? 
4. What motivated you to join the liberation struggle? 
5. What were you doing at the time? 
6. How long did you stay in exile? 
7. Did you get any qualifications or skills in while in exile? 
8. Did you leave any dependents, when you left? 
9. Did you have any kids in Exile? 
10. Did you return at independence or later? 
11. Explain the return process – who welcomed you? Where did you go 
12. Did you get any financial assistance upon arrival? 
13. How did you go back to civilian life? 
14. When did you start working for remuneration? 
15. How many dependents did you have at the time you were 
repatriated? 
16. If yes, how many dependants were going to primary, secondary and 
tertiary school? 
 
17. Who paid or pays for their education? 
18. What is your employment status? 
 
19. Income status 
1.1. What was your basic salary when you started working, mark 
the appropriate column. 
Employed SELF-
MPLOYED 
Unemployed Disabled 
due to war 
Pensioner Others 
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1.2. What is your current basic salary, mark the appropriate 
column. 
20. How will you define a Namibian War Veteran? 
21. Who do you think should qualify as a Namibian War Veteran? 
22. What qualifies for one to become a Namibian War Veteran? 
23. Do you think Namibian War Veterans are in categories, if yes, what 
categories? 
24. What is your experience with Namibia Liberation Struggle, please 
explain? 
25. What is your experience when you were repatriated from exile, and 
how have life been since you were repatriated? 
26. In your own opinion, how much in terms of remuneration should be 
paid to War Veteran in Namibia? 
27. Do you think the compensation should be conferred according to the 
categories of the roles they played in the liberation struggle? 
28. Do you think there is a category that needs to be compensated more 
than others? If yes, tell me why? 
29. What is your view on the Namibian War Veterans Compensation 
package? 
30. Are you satisfied/dissatisfied with the compensation, if yes/no, why? 
31. Do you think that Namibian War Veterans are entitled to 
compensation, if yes tell me why?  
32. Do you think the Namibian Government and particularly the 
Ministry of War Veteran Affairs has addressed the Namibian War 
Veteran Compensation issue in efficiently? 
33. In your opinion do you think the issue of compensation of War 
Veterans should have been handled differently? 
 In your view, was the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and 
Integration correctly done, if yes/no, explain? 
34. In your own opinion, who was supposed to carry out the above task, 
UN or Namibian Government or other actors? 
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35. On the issue of Struggle Kids or children of Liberation Struggle, Do 
you believe we have struggle Kids? How should they be treated? 
36. Do you think they too, must be compensated? If yes/no, why? 
37. Which Ministry do you think is responsible for the Struggle Kids? 
The Ministry of War Veterans or Ministry of Youths, Sport and 
Culture, please explain? 
38. Do you think the Government has now found a lasting solution to the 
plight of Namibian War Veterans? 
39. For How long a Namibian War Veteran, be assisted, once off or for 
life? If, yes, Why?  
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APPENDIX B 
Profile of respondents 
 
 YDate of 
Bi birth 
Year 
Went in 
exile 
Years 
in 
exile 
Age 
at 
time 
Current 
age 
Education 
when left 
Qualifications/skills Employment 
status 
 
Employ
ment 
year 
Salary on 
employment 
Current 
salary 
 
Depen
dents 
on 
return 
Sex 
1 1962 1980-
1989 
9 20 56 Std 8 Military in battle 
front for 3yrs and 
2yrs certificate 
employed 1997 500.00 18000.00 1 F 
2 1959 1976-
1989 
13 17 57 Form 
one 
Military+ got 
injured and left 
to do a 2yrs 
diploma 
employed 1990 800.00 35000.00 1 M 
3 1963 1979-
1989- 
11 16 53 Std 10 Military training, 
combant soldier 
and diploma in 
public 
management 
employed 1995 600.00 18000.00 2 F 
4 1957 1974-
1989 
15 17 59 Std 6 Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1990 1200 34000.00 1 m 
5 1960 1977-
1989 
12 17 56 Form 
one 
Soldier/ basic 
medical training 
to treat fellow 
soldier 
employed 1990 800.00 34000.00 2 m 
6 1960 1975-
1989 
14 15 56 none Military 
training/element
ary education in 
/Radio 
communication 
employed 1990 300.00 22000.00 2 m 
7 1956 1975-
1989 
14 19 60 Form 
two 
Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1990 1200.00 34000.00 1 m 
8 1957 1974-
1989 
15 17 59 none Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1990 1200.00 34000.00 none m 
9 1957 1976-
1989 
14 19 59 none Military/ basic 
medical aid 
employed 1992 600.00 28000.00 none m 
1
0 
1957 1976-
1989 
13 15 59 none Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1997 300.00 8000.00 none m 
1
1 
1957 1974-
1989 
15 17 59 none Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1997 300.00 8000.00 1 m 
1
2 
1961 1977-
1989 
12 16 55 Std 5 Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1990 300.00 8000.00 1 m 
1
3 
1964 1980-
1989 
9 16 52 Std 8 Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1997 300.00 8000.00 none m 
1
4 
1960 1979-
1989 
10 19 56 Form 
one 
Military training 
in soviet and 
employed 1990 300.00 8000.00 1 m 
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soldier for my 
whole stay in 
exile 
1
5 
1965 1980-
1989 
9 15 51 Std 7 Military training 
in soviet and 
soldier for my 
whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1990 300.00 8000.00 3 m 
1
6 
1959 1975-
1989 
10 16 57 Contract 
labourer
3 
Military training 
in soviet and 
soldier for my 
whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1997 300.00 8000.00 1 m 
1
7 
1962 1978-
1989 
11 16 54 Form 
one 
Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1997 600.00 8000.00 none m 
1
8 
1958 1975-
1989 
14 17 58 Form 
one 
Military training 
and soldier for 
my whole stay in 
exile 
employed 1997 800.00 12000.00 none m 
1
9 
1963 1980-
1989 
9 17 53 Std 8 Studied in West 
Africa/ teachers 
training 
employed 1991 750.00 18000.00 1 F 
2
0 
1955 1977-
1989 
12 22 61 Contract 
labour 
Military training, 
three years 
diploma/ 
combatant 
soldiers 
Employed 
non-
profitOrga
nisation 
1990 800-00 12000 .00 3 m 
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